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PREFACE 
Intrusion detection is a critical component of secure information systems. The 
purpose of this study is to identify important input features in building an intrusion 
detection system which is least computational expensIve and to build an intrusion 
detection system which is effective. Since elimination of useless or insignificant inputs 
leads to a simplification of the problem, faster and accurate results will result. Feature 
ranking and selection or data reduction, therefore, is an important issue for data 
classification in intrusion detection systems. Independent component analysis algorithm, 
and principal component analysis algorithm, is used for data reduction in intrusion 
detection systems. For effective intrusion detection, we use Bayesian belief network 
classifier, and classifi.cation and regression trees classifier for data classification. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Security and Intrusion Detection 
Computer or Network security has been studied as a discipline since the early 
1970s. It refers to measures and controls that protect an information system against denial 
of service and unauthorized (accidental or intentional) disclosure, modification, or 
destruction of infonnation systems and data. A secure computer or network system 
should provide the following services-data confidentiality, data and communications 
integrity, and assurance against denial-of-service. Data confidentiality service protects 
infonnation or data against unauthorized disclosure. This service should protect release of 
a message's content to unauthorized users. Data and communications integrity service is 
concerned with the accuracy, faithfulness, non-coITuptibility, and beli vability of 
information transfer between peer entities (including computers connected by a network). 
This service must ensure correct operation of the system hardware and finnware, and it 
should protect against unauthorized modification of data and labels. Denial-of-service is 
an important security service. A denial-of-service condition is said to exist whenever the 
system throughput falls below a pre-established threshold, or when access to a (remote) 
entity is unavailable. While such attacks are not completely preventable, it is often 
desirable to reduce the probability of such attacks below some threshold. 
Though different comput r or network systems may ha diffi rent definitions of 
security computer scientists have developed common security mechanisms to prot ct 
computer systems. Early attempts of the protection m chanisms include authentication or 
identification, encryption access control, etc. The goal of th se mechanisms is to prevent 
unauthorized users from compromising the data confidentiality, data and communicatjons 
integrity, and assurance against denial-of-service. Thus they can be collectively called 
prevention-based techniques. 
It has been noticed that the prevention-based techniques cannot assure the s curity 
of the systems being protected. For example, in 1998 the Internet worm brought down the 
majority of the Internet by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in Ish, fingerd, and 
sendmail. Even in the year 2000, the so-called Distributed Denial of Service (ODoS) 
attacks stopped several major commercial sites, including Yahoo and CNN, from 
functioning normally, though they were protected by prevention-based techniques. 
Indeed a deeper reason is that the processes with whi.ch human beings develop 
information systems are. not completely error-proof: there may be bugs in the 
implementation of the systems" and, moreover, there may be errors in the design of the 
information systems. 
Intrusion detection was proposed to complement the prevention-ba ed security 
measures. An intrusion is defined to be a violation of the security policy of the system; 
intrusion detection thus refers to the mechanisms that are developed to detect the 
violation of the system security policy. Intrusion detection is based on the assumption 
that intrusive activities are noticeably different from normal system activities and thus 
detectable. Intrusion detection is not introduced to replace the prevention-based 
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techniques such as authentication and access control' instead it is intended to bused 
along with the existing security rneasur s and detect the actions that bypass the securit 
control of the system. Thus, intrusion detection is usually considered as a second line of 
defense for computer and network systems. 
Intrusion detection is defined to be the problem of identifying users or hosts or 
programs that are using a computer system without authorization and those who have 
legitimate access to the system but are abusing their privileges (i.e. the "insider threat"). 
Generally, an intrusion would cause loss of integrity, denial of resources, or unauthorized 
use of resources. 
Some specific examples of intrusions that concern system administrators include: 
• Unauthorized modifications of system files so as to permit unauthorized access to 
either system or user infornlation. 
• Unauthorized access or modification of user files or information. 
• Unauthorized modifications of tables or other system information Ln network 
components (e.g. modifications of rout r tables in an internet to d ny us of the 
network). 
• Unauthorized use of computing resources (perhaps through the creation of 
unauthorized accounts or perhaps through the unauthorized use of existing 
accounts). 
Detecting attacks requires the use of a model of intrusion, namely, what should the 
IDS look for? The first model hypothesizes its detection upon the profile of a user's (or a 
group of users) nonnal behavior. It statistically analyzes parameters of the user's current 
session, compares them to the profile representing the user's normal behavior, and reports 
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significant deviations to a system security officer. Here significant is defined as a 
threshold set by the specific model or by the system security officer. A typical Intrusion 
detection system may report the top ten most suspicious sessions to the system security 
officer. Because it catches sessions, which are not normal, it is referred to as an 
"anomaly" detection model. 
The second type of model bases its detection upon a comparison of parameters of 
the user's session and the user's commands to a rule-base of techniques used by attackers 
to penetrate a system. Attack signatures (i.e. known attack methods) are what this model 
looks for in the user's behavior. Since this model looks for patterns known to cause 
security problems, it is called a "misuse" detection model. 
Early IDS models were designed to monitor a single host. However, more recent 
models accommodate the monitoring of a number of hosts interconnected by a network, 
e.g. ISOA, IDES, and DC Davis' Network Security Monitor (NSM) and Distributed 
Intrusion Detection System (DIDS). Some of these systems (ISOA and IDES) transfer the 
monitored information (host audit trails) from the monitored hosts to a central site for 
processing. Others (NSM, DIDS) monitor the network flow as well, as part oftheir 
intrusion detection algorithms. 
1.2 Current Problems 
Most existing intrusion detection systems suffer from some of the following 
problems: 
Current IDS lack data reduction procedures: The information used by the 
intrusion detection system is obtained from audit trails or from packets on a network. An 
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audit trail is defined to be th information consisting of all user and system interactions. 
The audit trail contains all the data need d to perfom1 intrusion detection. Ther might be 
more data than needed. Inspecting the sheer volume of audit information generated 
requires a large effort and it is computationally expensive. 
Current IDS lack effectiveness: An IDS is effective if it has both high intrusion 
detection (i.e. true positive rate) and low false alarm (i.e. false positive) rate. The 
handcrafted rules and patterns, and the statistical measures on selected system measures 
are the codified "expert knowledge" in security, system design, and the particular 
intrusion detection approaches in use. Expert knowledge is usually incomplete and 
imprecise due to the complexities ofthe network systems. 
In this thesis, we describe a mechanism that addresses above two problems and 
also has several other desirable characteristics. 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
Our objective is to apply two techniques to build an Intrusion detection y tem in 
two important ways: 
• Since Intrusion detection is done online, our task is to bui ld a model which 
is least computationally expensive (so elimination of redundant variables is 
important). We achieve this by data reduction using independent 
Component Analysis algorithm, principal component analysis algorithm, 
CBL2 algorithm on genera) Bayesian network classifier and CART 
algorithm. 
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• It is necessary to build efficient Intrusion detection systems for data 
modeling classification and prediction. So we do data classification by 
bUilding Bayesian etwork Intrusion detection model and Classification and 
Regression Trees (CART) Intrusion Detection model. We train the IDS to 
classify attacks by using Bayesian Belief Network data mining algorithm 
and CART algorithm. 
The dataset used for applying the above soft computing techniques is a sample of 
the network traffic and audit logs, which capture the actual behavior, in the foans of 
statistical summaries, of normal activities and intrusions. Therefore, the intrusion 
detection models built on this dataset can be more effective in distinguishing nonnal and 
intrusion activities. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Since the amount of audit data that an IDS ne ds to examine is very large even for 
a small network, data reduction is a necessary task. Also as intrusion detection i done 
online, data reduction is necessary to reduce the computational time and to maximize the 
scalability and fast re-training or tuning of an IDS. Data mining approaches are relatively 
new techniques for intrusion detection. Previous research in data mining approaches for 
intrusion detection model identified several types of algorithms as useful techniques. 
Classification is one of the data mining algorithms which have been -investigated as a 
useful technique for intrusion detection models. There are several classification 
algorithms available. Successful application of few algorithms for intrusion detection in 
previous research motivated us to use Bayesian belief network and classification and 
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regression trees as intrusion detection mOdels. Also no one has done research in this area 
by using classification and regression trees and Bayesian belief network for data 
reduction and as intrusion detection models. Classification and regression trees algorithm 
is unique among other decision tree algorithms because of its stable perfonnance and 
reliable results. Classification and regression trees is an excellent pre-processing 
algorithm to other data analysis techniques because classification and regression trees 
outputs can be used as inputs to improve the predictive accuracy of neural nets and 
logistic regression. Also Classification and regression trees can extract the most 
important variables from a very large dataset. Bayesian network PowerPredictor gave the 
best prediction accuracy on KDDCup 200 1 Task one, from among 114 submissions all 
over the world. Bayesian belief network being selected as KDDCup 2001 Data Mining 
Competition Winner inspired us to use it as an intrusion detection model. In this thesis 
we compare perfonnance accuracies of classification and regression trees and Bayesian 
belief network to know their advantages and disadvantages. Also we compare Baye ian 
BN classifier's perfonnance and classification and regression trees performance on the 
original datasets and on reduced datasets. 
Our ultimate objective is to build a model that is least computational expensive 
and to build classification and regression trees and Bayesian belief network intrusion 
detection models. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Dr. Dorothy Denning presented in 1986 what would become the pivotal paper in 
the area of computer system intnrsion detection. In her paper, Dr. Derming suggested tbat 
if it can be assumed that exploitation of a computer system involves an abnomlal use of 
the system, then security violations could be detected by looking for abnormal patterns of 
system usage. She went on to explain how profiles could be developed which described 
authorized user's normal activities. Unauthorized activity would then be indicated by 
behavior not fitting these individual profiles. The profiles can be created by maintaining a 
record of each user's actions and can be periodically updated to reflect possible changes 
in the user's normal activities .. Profiling has been used by many of the current IDSs. 
In this chapter, we first review definitions of intrusion, intrusion detection and 
intrusion detection system, characteristics of an intrusion detectio~l system, different 
intrusion detection methods and types of intrusion detection. Then we review different 
techniques employed in intrusion detection systems such as neural network techniques, 
support vector machine techniques, data mining techniques and then study intrusion 
detection in wireless ad-hoc networks. Then, finally we review data reduction in intrusion 
detection. 
2.1 Intrusion Detection 
Definition: Intrusion 
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Any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of a computer resollrce. 
This definition disregards the success or failme of those actions so it also corresponds to 
attacks against a computer system. 
Definition: Intrusion Detection: 
The problem of identifYing actions that attempt to compromIse the integrity, 
confidentiality, or availability of a computer resource. 
Definition: Intrusion Detection System 
A computer system (possibly a combination of software and hardware) that 
attempts to perform intrusion detection. 
Most intrusion detection systems try to perform their task in real time. However, 
there are also intrusion detection systems that do not operate in real time, either because 
of the nature of the analysis they perfonn or because they are meant for forensic analysis 
(analysis of what has happened in the past on a system). 
The definition of intrusion detection system does not include prev nting the 
intrusion from occurring, only detecting it and reporting it to the operator. There are some 
intrusion detection systems that try to react when they detect an unauthoriz d action. This 
reaction usually includes trying to stop the damage, for example by terminating a network 
connection. 
2.2 Characteristics of an intrusion detection system. 
An intrusion detection system will have the following characteristics: 
1. It must run continually with minimal human supervision. 
2. It must befault tolerant: 
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(a) The Intrusion detection system must be able to recover from system crashes, 
either accidental or caused by malicious activity. 
(b) After a crash, the intrusion detection system must be able to recover its previous 
state and start its operation unaffected. 
3. It must resist subversion: 
(a) For an attacker to disable or modify the intrusion det ction system there 
must be a significant difficulty. 
(b) The intrusion detection system must be able to monitor itself and detect if 
an attacker has modified it. 
4. It must impose a minimal overhead on the systems where it runs to avoid 
interfering with their normal operation. 
5. It must be configurable to accurately implement the security policies of the 
systems that are being monitored. 
6. It must be e,asy to deploy: This can be achieved through pOliability to different 
architectures and operating systems, through simple installation mechanisms, and 
by being easy to use and understandable by tbe operator. 
7. It must be adaptable to changes in system and user behavior over time. For 
example, new applications being installed, users changing [rom one activity to 
another or new resources being available can cause changes in system use 
patterns. 
8. It must be able to detect attacks: 
(a) The intrusion detection system must not recognize any legitimate activity 
as an attack (false positives). 
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(b) ,The intrusion detection systems must not fail to recognize any real attacks 
(false negatives). It must be difficult for an attacker to mask his actions to 
avoid detection. 
(c) The intrusion detection system must report attacks as soon as they occur. 
(d) The intrusion detection syst m must be general enough to detect di fferent 
types of attacks. 
2.3 Different Intrusion detection methods 
There are two types of intrusion detection methods: misuse detection and anomaly 
detection. 
2.3.1 Anomaly Detection 
By definition, anomalies are not normal. Anomaly detection assumes that an 
intrusion will always reflect some deviations from nonnal patterns. Anomaly detection 
can be divided into static and dynamic, A static anomaly detector is based on the 
assumption that there is a portion of system being monitored that should remain constant. 
Usually, static detectors only address the software portion of a ystem and are based on 
the assumption that the hardware need not be checked. ystem administration tool check 
physical component configurations and report change, so such tools will not be treated 
here. The static portion of a system is the code for the syst m and the constant portion of 
data upon which the correct functioning of the system depends. tatic portions of the 
system can be represented as a binary bit string or a set of such strings (such as files). If 
the static portion of the system ever deviates from its original form, an error has occurred 
or an intruder has altered the static portion of the system. Static anomaly detectors are 
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meant for checking data integrity. Tripwire [Kim 93, Kim 94] and Self-Nonself 
[Forrest94] are examples of IDS that perfonn static anomaly detection. 
Dynamic anomaly detectors such as NIDES [Anderson95a, Anderson95b 
Javitz93, and Lunt93] or Pattern Matching [Hofmeyer97] must have a definition of 
behavior to classify as normal or anomalous. Frequently, system designers employ the 
notion of event. Behavior is defined as a sequence of distinct actions that cause events 
that are recorded in audit records. Since audit records of operating system only record 
events of interest, then the only behavior that can be observed is that which results in an 
event in an audit record. Events may occur in a sequence. In some cases such as with 
distributed systems, partial ordering of events is sufficient. In still other cases, the order is 
not directly represented; only cumulative information, such as cumulative processor 
resource used during a time interval, is maintained. In this case, thresholds are defined to 
separate normal resource consumption from anomalous resource consumption. 
INORMAL UNCERTAIN ANOMALOUS 
Figure 2.1: Anomalous behavior must be distinguished from nonnal behavior. 
2.3.2 Misuse Detection 
Misuse detection is based on the knowledge of system vulnerabilities and the 
known attack patterns. Misuse detection is concerned with catching intruders who are 
attempting to break into a system by exploiting some known vulnerability. Ideally, a 
system security administrator would be able to aware of all the known vulnerabilities and 
would eliminate them. 
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The term intrusion scenario is used as a description of a known kind of intrusion' it 
is a sequence of events that would result in an intrusion without some outside preventive 
intervention. An intrusion detection system continually compares recent activity to the 
intrusion scenarios to make sure that someone or combinations of someone's are not 
attempting to exploit known vulnerabilities. To perfornl this each intrusion scenario must 
be described or modeled in some way. Generally, intrusion scenarios are quite specific. 
The main difference between the misuse techniques is in how they describe or 
model the bad behavior that constitutes an intrusion. Initial misuse detection systems 
used rules to describe the events indicative of intrusive actions that a security 
administrator looked for within the system. Large numbers of rules can be difficult to 
interpret if the rules are not grouped by intrusion scenarios since making modifications to 
the rule set can be difficult if the affected rules are spread out across the rule set. To 
overcome these difficulties, alternative intrusion scenario representations are developed. 
These new rule organizational techniques include model-based rul organization and stat 
transition diagrams. Better rule organization allowed the intrusion scenarios to be 
described in a more expressive. and understandable way for the misuse d tection system 
user. 
Misuse detection systems use the rules to look for events that possibly fit an 
intrusion scenario. The events may be monitored live by monitoring system calls or later 
using audit records. Although most systems use audit records, they would be 
fundamentally the same if they were collecting live system information. 
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2.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of Anomaly detection and Misuse detection 
The main disadvantage of misuse detection approaches is that they will detect only 
the attacks for which they are trained to detect. Novel attacks or unknown attacks or even 
variants of common attacks often go undetected. In a time when new security 
vulnerabilities in software are discovered and exploited every day, the reactive approach 
embodied by misuse detection methods is not feasible for defeating malicious attacks. 
The main advantage of anomaly detection approaches is the ability to detect novel 
attacks or unknown attacks against software systems, variants of known attacks, and 
deviations of nonnal usage of programs regardless of whether the source is a privileged 
internal user or an unauthorized external user. The disadvantage of anomaly detection 
approaches is that well-known attacks may not be detected, particularly if they fit the 
established profile of the user. Once detected, it is often difficult to characterize the 
nature of the attack for forensic purposes. Another drawback of many anomaly detection 
approaches is that a malicious user who knows he or she is being profiled can change his 
or her profile slowly over time to essentially train the anomaly detection method to learn 
his or her malicious behavior as normal. Finally a high false positive rate may result for a 
narrowly trained detection algorithm, or conversely, a high false negative rate may result 
for a broadly trained anomaly detection approach. 
2.4 Types of Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are two types of intrusion detection systems: host-based intrusion detection 
systems and network-based intrusion detection systems. Host-based systems base their 
decisions on infonnation obtained from a single host (usually audit trails), while network-
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based systems obtain data by monitoring the traffic in the network to which the hosts are 
connected. 
2.4.1 Host-based Intrusion Detection 
A generic intrusion detection model proposed by Dr. Dorothy Denning (1986 
works as a rule-based pattern matching system which includes the following six 
components: 
1. Subjects: A subject is the "initiator" of an action being performed on the host, 
e.g., a user or the host itself. 
2. Objects: An object is the "receptor of an action e.g., a system device or a system 
file. 
3. Audit records: An audit record represents an action initiated by the subject and 
that occurred on the object. Some quantitative measurements on the action are 
also included in the audit record e.g. CPU usage time or I/O activity. 
4. Profiles: A profile is the "signature or description of normal activity" of a subject 
or a group of subjects concerning an object or a group of objects. e.g., a profile on 
the CPU usage of a user session or a profile on the CPU usage of a program. 
Many statistical models can be included to calculate these quantitative. 
5. measurements in these profiles. Some examples include the mean and standard 
deviation model, Markov process model, and time serial model. 
6. Anomaly records: An anomaly record is used to record an anomalous event that 
has been detected. 
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7. Activity rules: An activity mle explains what action will be taken under some 
conditions. For example, when a new audit record is created the corr sponding 
profile will be updated automatically. 
So, intrusion detection tasks are conducted by checking the similarity between the 
current audit record and the corresponding profiles. If the current audit record deviates 
from the nonnal patterns, it will be considered an anomaly. 
On the basis of the SRI's IDES (Lunt and Jagannathan 1988) Dr. Denning's model 
has been proposed. SRI's IDES has two components: tbe statistical anomaly detector and 
the expert system (Mukherjee, Heberlein, and Levitt 1994). Based on Denning's model, 
the first component is used to detect anomalies by applying statistical methods i.e. the 
normal patterns are constructed by use of statistical analysis and the anomaly intrusions 
are detected by assuming that there will be always some differences between normal 
patterns and intrusions. The expert system component of SRI's IDES is constructed as a 
rule-based system and is used to detect the intrusions whose patterns are already known. 
2.4.2 Single Host Intrusion Detection Systems 
After the publication of Dr. Denning's paper several IDSs have been developed. 
These systems use profile and rule-based approaches to identify intrusive activity. The 
system's audit trail is used in almost all systems to provide the infonnation on individual 
user activities. 
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2.4.2.1 Clyde Digital Systems' AUDIT 
Clyde Digital System s AUDIT package is one of the first systems designed to 
detect unauthorized activity on a computer system. Original designed to address the 
'insider threat' (i.e. detecting unauthorized activity perfonned by authorized users) 
raised interest in countering intruders. The developers realized that many of the actions 
they implemented to identify unauthorized activity performed by authorized users would 
be the same type of actions needed to identify external intruders. The AUDIT package is 
designed for use on a VAXfYMS system. 
AUDIT was designed to detect five categories of activity considered harmful to 
the computer system or the data it contains if they were performed in an unauthorized 
manner. These five activities would also be considered detrimental if performed by an 
intruder. The five categories are: 
• Denial ofservice: irresponsible or inoperable system. 
• Information Loss: destroyed data. 
• Disinfornlation: altered data. 
• Infonnation Compromise: released data. 
• Resource Exploitation: inappropriately used resources. 
The AUDIT package has a certain limited analysis capability. Since recording all 
actions and the keystrokes for all users can produce a tremendous amount of data, 
AUDIT has the ability to limit the data to certain users, times of the ~ay, or specific 
programs. The analysis that AUDIT performs results in three reports: a summary report 
which lists the activity of"high risk" users.; a security event report detailing the events 
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that caused users to be listed as 'high risk'; and a supporting data report which includes 
additional information justifying the conclusions of the other reports. 
2.4.2.2 MIDAS 
MIDAS stands for the Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System. MIDAS 
was designed to detect intrusive activity on the Multics operating system and runs on a 
stand-alone Symbolic Lisp machine. 
MIDAS addresses five general threat areas; break-ins, masquerading, penetrations, 
misuse, and Trojan horses/viruses. Misuse is a combination of leakage and denial of 
service. Identi fication of an instance of one of these threats is based on the heuristic rules 
used by the expert system on the Symbolic machine. There are four types of heuristics 
rules used in MIDAS. Immediate rules are those that make no use of historical 
infonnation but instead represent activities that by them are suspicious. Anomaly rules 
use statistical user profiles to detect when current user behavior departs from expected 
patterns of behavior. The profiles include information such as the user's usual acces time 
and access location, expected typing rate, and the usual commands executed. System-
wide state rules use a system-wide profile maintained by MIDAS, which characterizes 
the norn1al global state of the system. Finally, sensitive path rules attempt to match the 
current user's sequence of commands with a command sequence for a known or 
postulated type of attack. 
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2.4.2.3 COMPUTER\VATCH 
COMPUTERWATCB is an add-on audit trail analysis tool developed by AT&T to 
work with the UNIX System VIMLS operating system. This specific version of UNIX 
has been evaluated and certified to the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria B 1 
level of security. This includes a distinct advantage for this package since it means that a 
certain minimal set of audit records can be expected. It also means, however, that a large 
amount of data will be produced by the system when the audit trail features are invoked. 
In order to minimize the amount of data generated by its audit trails, System VIMLS uses 
a binary format which reduces the average size of an audit record to just sixteen bytes. 
Two different types of reports are generated: a canned report which uses a set of 
rules to detect potential anomalies, and a user specified report which allows the security 
manager to perform the analysis. The canned reports/queries include listings of failed and 
successful logins, failed file accesses, failed and successful attempts to gain super user 
privileges, and other similar events. COMPUTERWATCB is, not designed to be a real-
time, stand-alone intrusion detection tool but rather an interactiv tool to be lIsed by a 
system manager to perform different types of analysis on the systems audit trail. 
2.4.2.4 DISCOVERY 
The DISCOVERY package is an expert system-based intrusion detection system 
developed by TRW. It is not a general purpose intrusion detection package but is instead 
a unique package designed to be used for computer services that are sold to an 
organization other than the owner of the computer system itself. DISCOVERY is 
designed to recognize the patterns in the usage of authorized users and to store these 
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patterns in profiles for each user. The DISCO ERY package does not operat in real-
time but is instead designed to produce a report at the end of each workday for the 
security manager, which lists any suspicious activities that occurred. 
DISCOVERY allows the security manager to select the variabl s to be monitored 
and to set the levels atom lithography which suspicions will be raised. DISCOVERY not 
only checks the selected variables against the stored user profile, it also compares user 
activities against canned scenarios of intruder access. The user profiles are updated daily. 
A limitation of discovery is that it only analyzes correct interactions with the 
system and does not check specific or patterns of errors. Because of this, DISCOVERY 
ignores an extremely valuable source of information on possible intrusive activities. 
2.4.2.5 IDES 
IDES stands for the Intrusion Detection Expert System and it was developed atom 
lithography SRI International for the States Navy SPAWAR organization. IDES falls 
uses a profile-based approach to determine when a user's current actions fall outside of 
an established norm. The profile data kept is updates daily and is weighted so that the 
most recent observations are given a greater influence on the determination of user nonns 
than are older values. This allows IDES to adapt to changes in user behavior that might 
occur as a result of new assignments or responsibilities. Like MIDAS, lDES performs its 
analysis on stand-alone system in real-time. IDES, however, uses a Sun Workstation (as 
its platform) linked to the monitored host. 
An additional feature of [DES is that it is designed to be host-system independent. 
The receiver is the only component that would need to be modified to adapt [DES to 
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monitor a different host. This assumes, ho ever that while the new host's audit records 
may not be in the same [annat as what is expected by IDES, it nonetheless has the 
necessary audit capability. One disadvantage of IDES however, is the need for a separate 
system to perfonn the intrusion detection. While this adds a certain extra level of 
security, the cost is prohibitive unless applied to a network instead of single hosts. 
2.4.2.6 Haystack 
The Haystack system was developed for use by the United States Air Force on 
their standard base-level Unisys 1100/60 mainframe computer system. Like the Clyde 
Digital Systems AUDIT package, Haystack was initially intended to detect threats from 
insiders (i.e., authorized users) who were exceeding their authority. This was initially 
believed to be the biggest threat for the specific system the Air Force wanted monitored. 
Later, as both Haystack and the connectivity of Air Force systems evolved, the goal of 
the package was extended to include detecting intrusiv activity from outsiders. 
Haystack is designed to detect six different categories of intrusive behavior. These 
six categories are listed below: 
• Attempted/successful break-ins 
• Masquerading 
• Leakage 
• Denial of Service 
• MaLicious Use 
• Penetration of the Security Control System 
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The first two categories can be detect d through observations that indicate the 
user's current activities faU outside of an established norm for that particular user or for 
the group tbe user is a member of. The next three categories can be detected through 
abnormal usage of the system and its resources. The tinaJ category is detected by 
observing the use of certain privileged commands or services. 
As mentioned before, one of the problems with the use of user profiles is the 
ability for users to change their profile over a period of time by slowly modifying their 
behavior. Haystack solves this problem by the use of a group profile. Each user is 
assigned to a specific group, which is made up of other users with similar responsibilities 
and authority. While it is possible for a user to change an individual profile, the bYfOUP 
profile is not as easily modified and can thus be used to detect abnormal behavior. Even 
though group profile approach alleviates some of the problems associated with individual 
user profiles, the approach taken in Haystack to implement them was imperfect. Users are 
often hard to assign to groups, which has resulted in numerous single-user groups at sites 
using Haystack. A better methodology needs to be implemented in Haystack for 
assigning users to 'groups. 
An interesting issue that arose during the development of Haystack iUustrates one 
of the problems with analysis of audit trails. The discussion surrounds the event horizon. 
which is the method, used to determine the number of events or records the system 
considers when performing its analysis. An event horizon of one is equivalent to an 
analysis based only on the current record and the stored user profiles. An event horizon of 
four means that the analysis will consider the current record and the three previous 
records. The problem with an event horizon of one however is that certain trends or 
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patterns, which indicate the existence of intru ive activity, might be missed since only the 
current record is considered. The problem with event horizons greater than one, however 
is their computational intensity. The larger the horizon the better the analysis but the 
more expensive it is computationally. Haystack employs an event horizon of one. 
The output of haystack consists of two reports: summary report which provides an 
overview of what processing has occurred on the monitored system in addition to a list of 
new users and users whose actions were considered 'suspicious' and the detailed report 
which lists all anomalous events for each user. 
2.4.3 Network-Based Intrusion Detection 
'With the proliferation of computer networks, more and more individual hosts are 
connected into LANs of small scale or WANs of large scale. However, the hosts, as wen 
as the networks, are exposed to intrusions due to the vulnerabilities ofnetwork devices 
and network protocols. The TCP/IP protocol can be also exploited by network intrusions 
such as 1P spoofing, port scanning, and so on. So, network-based intrusion detection has 
become important and is designed to protect a computer network as well as all of its 
hosts. The installation of a network-based intrusion detection system can also decrease 
the burden of the intrusion detection task on every individual host. 
To detect network-based intrusions, Heberl.ein et al proposed a network security 
monitor (NSM), which has a hierarchical architecture composed of the following five 
layers (from lowest to highest): 
1. Packet catcher: It will monitor network traffic, catch every packet, and send it to 
the next layer. 
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2. Parser: It will analyze every incoming packet summarize the security-related 
information into a four dimensional vector of <source address destination 
address, service, connection ill>, and pass it to the next layer. 
3. Matrix generator: A corresponding four-dimensional matrix is maintained. Since 
the connection ID is unique, every connection will be represented by one cell in 
4. the matrix. A cell usually stores two measurements: the number of packets and the 
total data bytes transferred in one connection. 
5. Matrix analyzer: Since the matrix actually represents the network traffic, the 
matrix analyzer will compare it with the normal patterns by use of a "masking" 
method. Anomaly intrusions will be detected because they will not be masked by 
normal patterns. 
6. Matrix archiver: It will store the matrix atom lithography intervals, e.g., every 
fourteen minutes. These matrices can then be used to construct normal patterns of 
network traffic. 
NSM detects network anomalies by monitoring network traffic. or misuse 
detection, LANL's (Los Alamos National Laboratory) NADIR (Network Anomaly 
Detection and Intrusion Reporter) is built as a rule-base expert system through "audit 
analysis and consultation with security experts"(Mukherj ee, Heberlein, and Levitt 1994). 
2.4.4 Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
Early intrusion detection efforts were concentrated on developing a single-host 
system. Today's computing environment is increasingly becoming heavily networked. 
Actually, there are certain types of attacks, which are considered as normal by the single-
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host intrusion d,etection systems, but if looked at from a networked perspective, might be 
indicative of intrusive activity. 
A Single-host IDS would normally not become suspicious if a single failed logon 
occurred. If, however, a series of single logon failures all to the same account but on 
different systems, was observed, this might indeed be indicative of an individual 
attempting to gain access to the network and its computer systems. 
2.4.4.1 NSM 
The Network Security Monitor (NSM) was developed atom lithography the 
University of California, Davis, and was originally based on simple traffic analysis. It is 
designed to detect intrusive behavior in a network by exploiting the broadcast nature of a 
network in order to perform an analysis on the packet traffic. NSM's goal is to address 
three problems that exist in audit trail based IDSs. First networks are often of a 
heterogeneous nature. There may be several different types of system connected to the 
net, each with different audit trail formats and features. Since there is little 
standardization among system audit trails, basing a network ill on audit trail analysis 
would require comparison of possibly many different audit trail formats. A second 
problem with audit trails is that often they are simply turned off because they are 
expensive in tenus of both storage space and CPU time. Finally, the audit trails 
themselves become a target of intruders who know that the audit trail may reveal their 
activities. By depending on an analysis of the network traffic instead of audit trails, NSM 
avoids these problems. 
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2.4.4.2 DIDS 
The Distributed Intrusion detection System (DillS) was developed by the United 
States Air Force by the same individuals at the University of California, Davis that were 
responsible for NSM. The purpose of DillS is to monitor a heterogeneous network 
consisting of a series of monitored and unmonitored hosts. 
2.4.4.3 NADIR 
NADIR, the Network Anomaly Detection and Intrusion Reporter, is in use on the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory's Integrated Computing Network (ICN). Unlike several 
of the other systems; NADIR is not designed to be used in a variety of different 
environments but instead is designed to be used on the unique configuration that exists in 
the ICN. 
2.5 Different Approaches toward Intrusion Detection 
Here we talk about different approaches used by intrusion detection systems to represent 
knowledge" on a system and analyze audit information in order to detect an intrusion. We 
shall concentrate on the most well known ones such as Artificial Intelligence techniques 
which include Artificial Neural Networks and Support Vector machines, Data Mining 
techniques and Wireless Ad hoc Networks in intrusion detection systems. 
2.5.1 Artificial In telligence 
Two artificial intelligent techniques are studied: Artificial Neural etworks 
(ANNs) and Support Vector Machines (SVMs). 
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2.5.1.1 Artificial Neural Networks 
An artificial Neural Network consists of a collection of treatments to transfonn a 
set of inputs to a set of searched outputs, through a set of simpl processing units, or 
nodes and connections between them. Subsets of the units are input nodes, output nodes, 
and nodes between input and output form bidden layers; the connection between two 
units has some weight, used to determine how much one unit will affect the other. Two 
types of architecture of Neural Networks can be distinguished: 
1. Supervised training algorithms, where in the learning phase, tbe network learns 
the desired output for a given input or pattern. The well-known architecture of 
2. supervised neural network is the Multi-Level Perceptron (MLP); the MLP IS 
employed for Pattern Recognjtion problems. 
3. Unsupervised training algorithms, where in the learning phase, the network learns 
without specifying desired output. Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) are popular 
unsupervised trainjng algorithms; a SOM tries to find a topological mapping from 
the input space to clusters. SOM are employed for classification problems. 
The most important property of a Neural Network is to automatically learn/retrain 
coefficients in the Neural Network from the data inputs and data outputs. When applying 
the Neural Network approach to Intrusion Detection, we first have to expose Neural 
Networks to normal data and then to attacks to automatically adjust coefficients of the 
Neural Networks during the training phase. Performance tests are then finally conducted 
with real network traffic and attacks. 
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Neural Networks have been largely employed with success for complex problems 
such as Pattern Recognition, hand-written character recognition, Statistical Analysis. 
Application of Neural Networks in Misuse Detection 
Rule-based intrusion detection has been considered as effective if the exact 
characteristics of the attack are known. However, network intrusions are constantly 
changing because of individual approaches taken by attackers and regular changes in the 
software and hardware of the targeted systems. Because of the infinite variety of attacks 
and attackers even a dedicated effort to constantly update the rule base of an expert 
system can never hope to accurately identify the variety of intrusions. 
Rapidly changing nature of network attacks requires a flexible defensive system 
that is capable of analyzing the enormous amount of network traffic in a manner, which is 
less structured than rule-based systems. A neural network-based misuse detection system 
could potentially address many of the problems that are found in rule-based systems. 
Advantages of Neural Network-based. Misuse Detection Systems 
The first advantage in the utilization of a neural network 1n th detection of 
instances of misuse would be the flexibility that the network would provide. Even if the 
data is incomplete or distorted, neural network would be capable of analyzing the data 
from the network. In the same way, the network would possess the ability to conduct an 
analysis with data in a non-linear fashion. 
Another advantage of neural networks is its inherent speed. Because the protection 
of computing resources requires the timely identification of attacks, the processing speed 
of the neural network could enable intrusion responses to be conducted before irreparable 
damage occurs to the system. 
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The most important advantage of neural networks in misuse detection is the ability 
of the neural network to "learn" the characteristics of misuse attacks and to identify 
instances that are unlike any which have been observed before by the network. Also 
neural network might be trained to recognize known suspicious events with a high degree 
of accuracy. 
Disadvantages of Neural Network-based Misuse Detection Systems 
Primarily there are two reasons why neural networks have not been applied to the 
problem of misuse detection in the past. The first reason relates to the training 
requirements of the neural network. Because the ability of the artificial neural network to 
identify indications of an intrusion is completely dependent on the accurate training of 
the system, the training data and the training methods that are used are very important. 
The training routine requires a very large amount of data to ensure that the results 
are accurate. Also the training of a neural network for misuse detection purposes, may 
require thousands of individual attacks sequences, and it is very difficult to obtain large 
quantities of sensitive infonnation. 
The most significant disadvantage of applying neural networks to intrusion 
detection is the "black box" nature of the neural network. Unlike expert systems which 
have hard-coded rules for the analysis of events, neural networks adapt their analysis of 
data in response to the training which is conducted on the network. The connection 
weights and transfer functions of the various network nodes are usually frozen after the 
network has achieved an acceptable level of success in the identification of events. 
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Support Vector Machines 
Support vector machines, or SVMs, are learning machines that plot the training 
vectors in high dimensional feature space, labeling each vector by its Class. SVMs 
classify data by determining a set of support vectors which are members of the set of 
training inputs that outline a hyper plane in the feature space. 
SVMs provide a generic mechanism to fit the surface of the hyper plane to th data 
through the use of a kernel function, The user may provide a function (e.g., linear, 
polynomial, or sigmoid) to the SVMs during the training process, which selects support 
vectors along the surface of this function. The number of free parameters used in the 
SVMs depends on the margin that separates the data points, but not on the number of 
input features. These SVMs do not require a reduction in the number of features in order 
to avoid over fitting which is an advantage in intrusion detection. Another primary 
advantage of SVMs is the low expected probability of generalization errors. 
There are other reasons that we use SVMs for intmsion detection. The first reason 
is speed; because real-time, performance is of primary importance to intrusion detection 
systems, any classifier that can potentially run "fast" is worth considering. The second 
reason is scalability; SVMs are relatively insensitive to the number of data points and the 
classification complexity does not depend on the dimensionality of the feature space, so 
they can potentially learn a larger set of patterns and scale better than neural networks. 
Data Mining 
Across all industry sectors and scientific research areas, the amount of data 
collected and warehoused is growing at an explosive rate. However, it is believed hat less 
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than 10% of the stores data has ever been retrieved and analyzed. The reason is that it is 
easy and cheap to store the data but difficult and expensive to make good use of the vast 
amount of data. Since manual approaches are obviously impractical given the sheer 
volume of data and the demand for fast analysis results, new techniques are being 
discovered to intelligently assist humans in discovering useful knowledge from the 
database. These techniques are the subject of the growing field of knowledge discovery in 
databases (KDD). KDD can be defined as "the nontrivial process of identifying valid, 
novel, potentially useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data". Data mining is 
a particular step in the process in which specific algorithms are applied to extract patterns 
from data. 
Data Mining: What is it? 
Data mining is pattern finding. Data mmers are experts at using specialized 
software to find regularities ( and irregularities) in large data sets. Here are a few specific 
things that data mining might contribute to an intrusion detection project: 
• Remove normal activity from alann data to allow analysts to focus on real attacks 
• Identify false alarm generators and "bad' sensor signatures 
• Find anomalous activity that uncovers a real attack 
• Identify long, ongoing patterns (different IP address, same activity) 
To perform these tasks, data miners use one or more of the following techniques: 
• Data summarization with statistics, including finding outliers 
• Visualization: presenting a graphical summary of the data 
• Clustering of the data into natural categories 
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• Association rule discovery: defining nonnal activity and enabling the discovery of 
anomalies. 
• Classification: predicting the category to which a particular record belongs 
Data Mining Algorithms 
There are a wide variety of data mining algorithms, drawn from the fields of statistics, 
pattern recognition, machine learning, and databases. 
Classification: classifies a data item into one of several pre-defined categories. These 
algorithms normally output "classifiers", for example, in the form of decision trees or 
rules. An ideal application in intrusion detection would be to gather sufficient "normal" 
and "abnormal" audit data for a user or a program, then apply a classification algorithm 
to learn a classifier that can label or predict new unseen audit data as belonging to the 
normal class or the abnormal class. 
Link analysis: determines rel.ations between fields in the database records. Correlations 
of system features in audit data, for example, the correlation between command and 
argument in the shell command history data of a user, can serve as the basis for 
constructing normal usage profiles. 
Sequence analysis: models sequential patterns. These algorithms can discover what 
time-based sequences of audit events are frequently occurring together. These frequent 
event patterns provide guidelines for incorporating temporal and statistical measures into 
intrusion detection models. For example, patterns from audit data containing network-
based denial-of-service (DOS) attacks suggest that several per-host and per-service 
measures should be included. 
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The Data minin.g process of Building Intrusion Detection Models 
With the recent rapid development in KDD, we have gained a better wlderstanding 
of the techniques and process frameworks that can support systematic data analysis on 
the vast amount of audit data. The process of using data mining approaches to build 
intrusion detection models is explained here. 
Raw (binary) audit data is first processed into ASCn network packet information 
(or host event data), which is in turn summarized into connection records (or host session 
records) containing a number of within-connection features, e.g. service, duration, flag 
(indicating the normal or error status according to the protocols), etc. Data mining 
programs are then applied to the connection records to compute the frequent patterns i.e. 
association rules and frequent episodes, which are in turn analyzed to construct additional 
features for the connection records. Classification programs are then used to inductively 
learn the detection model. This process is of course iterative. For example, poor 
performance of the classification models often indicates that more pattern mining and 
feature construction is needed. 
2.6 Data Reduction for Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become important and widely used tools 
for ensuring network security. Since the amount of audit data that an IDS needs to 
examine is very large even for a small network, classification by hand is impossible. 
Analysis is difficult even with computer assistance because extraneous features can make 
it harder to detect suspicious behavior patterns. Complex relationships exist between the 
features, which are difficult for humans to discover. IDS must therefore reduce the 
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amount of data to be processed. This is very important if real-time detection is desired. 
Therefore, some form of data reduction is required for fDSs. Reduction can occur in one 
of several ways. Data that is not considered useful can b filtered leaving only the 
potentially interesting data. Data can be grouped or clustered to reveal hidden patterns; by 
storing the characteristics of the clusters instead of the data, overhead can be reduced. 
Finally, some data sources can be eliminated using feature selection. 
2.6.1 Data Filtering 
The purpose of data filtering is to reduce the amount of data directly handled by 
the IDS. Some data may not be useful to the IDS and thus can be eliminated before 
processing. This has the advantage of decreasing storage requirements and reducing 
processing time. However, filtering may throw ou't useful data, and so must be done 
carefully. 
2.6.2 Feature Selection 
In complex classification domains, some data may hinder the classification 
process. Features may contain false correlations, which hinder the process of detecting 
intrusions. Further, some features may be redundant since the information they add is 
contained in other features. Extra features can increase computation time, and can impact 
the accuracy of IDS. Feature selection improves classification by searching for the subset 
of features, which best classifies the training data. 
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2.6.3 Data Clustering 
Clustering can be performed to fmd hjdden patterns in data and significant features 
for use in detection. Clustering can also be used as a reduction teclmique by storing the 
characteristics of the clusters instead of the actual data. 
A Number of experiments have been performed to measure the performance of 
support vector macmnes and neural networks in intrusion detection, using the DARPA 
data for intrusion evaluation[MTTJ02]. Classifications were performed on the binary 
(nonnaVattack) as well as five-class classifications (nonnal, and four classes of attacks). 
It has been demonstrated that a large number of the (41) input features are urumportant 
and may be eliminated, without significantly lowering the performance of the 
IDS[MTTJ02]. Also the results showed that both SYMs and neural networks deliver 
highly accurate (99% and higher) performance, with SVMs showing slightly better 
perfo,rmance[MTTJ02]. 
Further, when reduction was performed to reduce the 41 features to the 13 most 
significant, botb SYMs and neural networks again were able to train to deliver accurate 
results for binary classification. In tenns of the five-class classification, they found using 
only 19 most important (of the 41) features; tbe change in accuracy was statistically 
insignificant. But the reduction in features was expected to reduce the cost of detection 
and the overhead of the intrusion detection as a whole. 
35 
Chapter 3 
DATA REDUCTION AND DATA 
CLASSIFICATION FOR INTRUSION 
DETECTION MODELS 
3.1 Independent Component Analysis 
Definition of leA: 
Let us assume that we have n linear mixtures Xl ...xn, of n independent components 
Xj = ajls, + aj2s2+aj3s3+ ... +ajnSn for all j. 
We assume that the mixture Xj and each independent component Sk are random variables 
so that we can drop the time index t and Sk need not be a proper time signal. The ob erved 
values Xj (t) (for e.g., the microphone signals of the cocktail party 'problem) are then a 
sample of this random variable. Using the vector notation 
x=As 
'.vhich can also be written as 
x = E aj SI 
the statistical model in above equation is called independent component analysis or ICA 
model [Hyvarinen]. The rCA model is a generative model, which means that it describes 
how the observed data are generated by a process of mixing the components Sj. The 
independent components are latent variables, meaning that they cannot be directly 
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observed. Also the mixing matrix i.s assumed to be unknown. All we observe is the 
random vector x, and we estimate both A and s using it. This is done under as the 
following general assumptjons as possible. 
Assumptions 
• The number of sensors is greater than or equal to the number of sources N>=M. 
• The sources s (t) are at each time instant mutually independent. 
• At most one source is normally distributed. 
• No sensor noise or only low additive noise signals are permitted. 
• The independent component must have nongaussian distributions. 
Definition: 
Independent Variables: 
Consider two scalar-valued random variables YI and Y2. The variables YI and Y2 are 
said to be independent if information on the value of YI does not give any information on 
the value of Y2, and vice versa. Above, we noted that this is the case with the variables Sl 
and S2 but not with the mixture variables Xl, X2. 
Technically, independence can be defined by the probability densities. Let us 
denote by p (YI, Y2) the joint probability function (pdf) of y, and Y2. Let us further denote 
the marginal pdfof Yl as PI (YJ), i.e. the pdf of YI is considered alone: 
PI (YI) = ., (yl, Y2) dY2, 
and similarly for Y2. Then we define that YI and Y2 are independent if and only if the joint 
pdf is factorizable in the following way: 
P (Yl, Y2) = PI (YI) P2 (Y2) 
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This definition extends naturally for any number n of random variables, in which 
case the joint density must be a product of n terms. 
Also uncorrelated variables are only partly independent. T 0 random variables YI 
and Y2 are said to be uncorrelated, if their covariance is zero: 
E {Y1Y2} - E {yd E {Y2} = 0 
If the variables are independent, they are uncorrelated but in the other way, uncorrelated 
ness does not imply independence. 
Principles of ICA algorithm 
1. Preprocessing for ICA - Before applying an ICA algorithm on the dataset, it is 
usually very useful to do some preprocessing for the dataset. We discuss below some 
preprocessing techniques that make the problem of ICA estimation much simpler and 
better. 
Centering: The most basic and necessary preprocessing is to center x the observed 
variable, i.e. subtract its mean vector m = E {x} so as to make x a zero-mean variable. 
This preprocessing is made to simplify the lCA algorithms: It does not mean that 
the mean could not be estimated. After estimating the mixing matrix A with centered 
data, we complete the estimation by adding the mean vector 0 f s back to the centered 
estimates of s. 
Wbitening: Another useful preprocessing strategy in ICA is to first whiten the observed 
variables. This means that before the application of lCA algorithm (and 
after centering), we transform the observed vector x linearly so that a new vector xwhich 
is white, i.e. its components are uncorrelated and their variances equal unity. 
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Whitening reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. Instead of having to 
estimate the n2 parameters that are elements of the orthogonal matrix A we only need to 
estimate the new, orthogonal maxing matrix A. An orthogonal matrix contains n (n-1)/2 
degrees of freedom. Whitening solves half of the problem of rCA. Because whitening is a 
very simple and standard procedure, much simpler than any lCA algorithms, it is a good 
idea to reduce the complexity. Also it is quite useful to reduce the dimension of the 
dataset at the same time as we do the whitening. 
2. "Nongaussian is independent" - The key to estimating the lCA model is 
measuring the nongaussianity. According to the classical statistical theory, random 
variables are assumed to have Gaussian distributions. 
3. Measures of nongaussianity - To use nongaussianity in lCA estimation, we 
must have a quantitative measure of a random variable, say y. To simplify, let us assume 
that y is centered (zero-mean) and has variance equal to one. Preprocessing the dataset 
before this makes this simplification possible. 
Kurtosis: The classical measure of nongaussianity IS kurtosis or the fourth-order 
cumulant. The kurtosis of y is classically defined by 
kurt (y) = E {l} - 3 (E {y2})2 
Actually, since we assumed that y is of unit variance, the right-hand side simplifies to 
E {y4} - 3. This shows that kurtosis is simply a normalized version of the fourth moment 
E {l}. For a Gaussian y, the fourth moment equals 3 (E {y2}i. Thus, 
kurtosis is zero for a Gaussian random variable. For most (but not all) no Gaussian 
random variables, kurtosis is nonzero. 
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Kurtosis can be both positive and negative. Random variables that have a negative 
kurtosis are called sub Gaussian and those With positive kurtosis are called super 
Gaussian. 
Negentropy: A second very important measure of nongaussianity IS negentropy. 
Negentropy is based on the information-theoretic quantity of (differential) entropy. 
Entropy is the basic concept of information theory. The entropy of a random 
variable is defined as the degree of information that the observation of the variable gives. 
The more random i.e. unpredictable and unstructured the variable is, the larger its 
entropy. 
Entropy H is defined for a discrete random variable Y as 
H (Y) = - l:P (Y = ai) log P(Y = ai) 
where the aj are the possible values of Y. This definition is generalized for continuous-
valued random variables and vectors, in which case it is often called differential entropy. 
The differential entropy H of a random vector y with density fey) is defined as: 
H (y) = - If (y) log f(y) dy. 
A fundamental result of information theory is that a Gaussian variable has the 
largest entropy among all random variables of equal variance. This means that entropy 
could be used as a measure ofnongaussianity. 
To obtain a measure of nongaussianity that IS zero for a Gaussian variable and 
always nonnegative, a slightly modified version of the definition of differenti.al entropy, 
called negentropy is used. Negentropy J is defined as follows: 
J (y) = H (y gauss) - H (y) 
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where ygauss is a Gaussian random variable of the same covariance matrix as y. From the 
above-mentioned properties, negentropy is always non-negative and it is zero if and only 
if y has a Gaussian distribution. 
4. Minimization of Mutual Information _ Mutual infonllation is the natural 
infonnation-theoretic measure of the independence of random variables. In this approach 
that is an alternative to the model estimation approach we define the ICA of a random 
vector x as an inve.rtible transformation i.e. s = Wx where W is the inverse matrix of A, 
where the matrix W is determined so that the mutual information of the transfonned 
components Sj is minimized. 
5. Maximum Likelihood estimation - Another very popular approach for 
estimating the ICA model is maximum likelihood estimation, which is closely connected 
to infomax principle. It is equivalent to minimization of mutual infonnation. 
3.2 Principal Component analysis 
Principal component analysis is applied in situations where, the dimension of the dataset 
is large, and also the components of the dataset are highly correlated (redundant). 
Principal component analysis is useful in this situation to reduce the dimension of the 
input vectors. This algorithm has three effects. 
• It orthogonalizes the components of the input vectors (so that they are 
uncorrelated with each other); 
• It orders the resulting orthogonal components (principal components) so that 
those with the largest variation come first; 
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• It eliminates those components that contribute the least to the variation in the data 
set. 
3.3 Independent Component Analysis and Principal 
Component Analysis for Intrusion Detection Data 
Reduction: 
The intrusion detection data is obtained from audit trails or from packets on a 
network. The audit trail sometimes contains more data than needed for intrusion 
detection. Inspecting large amounts of audit data generated requires large effort and it is 
computationally expensive. lCA and PCA algorithms solve this problem by data 
reduction. The lCA and PCA algorithms analyze whether the 41 variables of the DARPA 
dataset, are really important for intrusion detection to classify attacks, are independent 
and try to minimize the variables, which are correlated thereby reducing the 
computational time and extraneous work. 
3.4 Bayesian Belief Network 
The Bayesian network is a powerful knowledge representation and reasonmg 
algorithm under conditions of uncertainty. A Bayesian network B = (N, A 8) is a 
directed acyclic graph (DAG) (N, A) where each node n E represents a domain 
variable (e.g. a dataset attribute or variable), and each arc a E A between nodes 
represents a probabilistic dependency among the variables, quantified using a conditional 
probability distribution (CP table) OJ E 8 fOT each node 11; (see Pearl 1988). A B can be 
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used to compute the conditional probability of one node given values assigned to the 
other nodes. 
Many Bayesian network structure-learning algorithms have been developed. These 
algorithms generally fall into two groups, search & scoring based algorithms and 
dependency analysis based algorithms. Although some of these algoritluns can give good 
results on some benchmark data sets, there are still several problems such as Node 
ordering requirement, lack of efficiency, lack of publicly available learning tools. 
In order to resolve these problems, two algorithms such as Algorithm A and 
Algorithm B have been developed in the area of Bayesian network structure learning. 
Algorithm A deals with a special case where the node ordering is given, which requires 0 
(N2) CI tests and is correct given that the underlying model is DAG faithful. Algorithm B 
deals with the general case and requires 0 (N4) CI tests and is correct given that the 
underlying model is monotone DAG faithful. Based on these two algorithms, Bayesian 
network learning system. called Bayesian Network PowerConstructor has be n 
developed. 
Major advantage of Bayesian networks over many other types of predictive 
models, such as neural networks and decision trees, is that unlike those "black box" 
approaches, the Bayesian network structure represents the inter-relationships among the 
dataset attributes. Human experts can easily understand the network structures and if 
necessary can easily modify them to obtain better predictive models. By addi!lg decision 
nodes and utility nodes, BN models can also be extended to decision networks for 
decision analysis. 
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Several other advantages of Bayesian networks are explicit uncertainty 
characterization, fast and efficient computation and quick training. They are highly 
adaptive and easy to build, and provide explicit representation of domain specific 
knowledge in human reasoning framework. Also Bayes networks offer good 
generalization with limited training data, easy maintenance when adding new ~ atures or 
new training data. 
Feature Selection in Bayesian Belief Network: 
Reducing over fitting by considering only a subset of the features is called feature 
selection. A general Bayesian network classifier learning is that we can get a set of 
features that are on the Markov blanket of the class node. The Markov blanket of a node 
n is the union of n's parents, n's children and the parents of n's children. This subset of 
nodes shields n from being affected by any node outside the blanket. When using a BN 
classifier on complete data, the Markov blanket of the class node forms feature selection 
and aU features outside the Markov blanket are deleted from the BN. 
Bayesian Belief Network Software: 
Bayesian Belief Network software includes Bayesian network PowerConstructor 
(BN PowerConstructor), Bayesian network PowerPredictor (BN PowerPredictor), and 
Data Preprocessor. 
Bayesian Network PowerConstructor: 
It has two components, a user-friendly interface and a construction engine. It runs 
under 32-bit windows systems (i.e., Windows 95, Windows 98 and Windows NT) on 
pes. The system takes as input a database table and constructs a Bayesian network (both 
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structure and parameters) as output. It also supports domain knowledge as additional 
input. 
r-------------------------------
I Bayesian Network PowerConstructor 
I 
I ~ , 
1 API Construction Engine 
I (server)
1"---__--,,.....,..-----'  
IL _ 
[CBL98] Figure 3.1. System structure of Power onstructor 
The structure of the system is shown in figure I , from which we can see that the 
two components of the system (user interface and construction engine) are in a c1ient-
server structure and both of them are connected to different kinds of databases through a 
standard interface, Data Access Objects. 
The interface part of PowerConstructor is an executable file (BNPC.EXE). It first 
gathers the input information from the user using a five-step wizard. This information 
includes database formats, database location, data set name, domain knowledge etc. ext, 
the user interface calls the construction engine. When the construction engine finishes the 
process, the result is passed back as a parameter to the user interface. 
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Also we can see from the figure! that both the user interface and the construction 
engine are connected to the data access obj cts, which pro ides a standard interface to 
access databases. To access local desktop databases lik MS-Access, FoxPro, and 
Paradox, we use DAO/JET interface, which provides the database operation functions 
using the Microsoft Jet database engine. To access remot databases, we us 
DAO/ODBC direct interface, which passes commands directly to the remote database 
servers for processing. Because most of the workload is moved to the high-perfonnance 
database server, this method can speed up the Bayesian network learning process and 
save lot of resources in the local computer. 
The working mechanism of the construction engine is shown in the figure 3: 
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[CBL98] Figure 3.2. Working mechanism of the construction engine 
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Features of the PowerConstructor: 
User Interface: 
• Wizard-like interface: it gathers necessary input information through 5 simple 
steps. 
• Online help: Online help is available for each step. 
• Graphical belief network editor: it is available for modifying BN stmcture after 
the learning process. 
Construction Engine: 
• Accessibility: The system supports most of the popular desktop database and 
spreadsheet formats, including Ms-Access, dBase, FoxPro, Paradox, Excel and 
text file formats. It also supports remote database servers like Oracle SQL-server 
through ODBC. 
• Reusability: The construction engme is an ActiveX DLL, so it can be ea ily 
integrated into other belief network, data minjng or knowledge base systems for 
windows 95/98/NT. 
• Efficiency: In theory it reqUIres CI (conditional independence) tests to the 
complexity of 0 (N4) without node ordering and 0 (N2) when node ordering is 
given. (N is the number of attributes). In practice, the complexity is about 0 (N2) 
even without node ordering. 
• Supporting domain knowledge: Complete ordering. Partial ordering, direct causes 
and effects, forbidden links and root & leaf nodes can be used to constrain the 
search space and therefore speed up the construction process. 
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• Supporting large datasets: Running time is linear to the number of cases. 
• Supporting condensed datasets which has a frequency fields that contains the 
number of appearances of the current entry in the data. 
• Connectivity: The resulting Belief network (both structure and parameters) can be 
exported to other belief network systems. 
Bayesian Network PowerPredictor: 
This is a data mining system for data modeling/classification/prediction. This 
system is an extension of our BN learning system (BN PowerConstructor) to BN based 
classifier learning and using. It learns general Bayesian network classifiers and Bayes 
multi-net classifiers from training data and uses these classifiers to classify new data. The 
system can also perform feature subset selection automatically. 
Bayesian Multi-net: A Bayesian multi-net consists of the prior probability distribution 
of the class node and a set of local networks, each corresponding to a value that the class 
node can take. Bayesian multi-net allows the relations among the features to be different 
i.e., for different values the class node takes the features can form different local 
networks with different structures. This means, the class node can be also viewed as a 
parent of all the feature nodes since each local network is associated with a value of the 
class node. It is called as unrestricted BN classifier as it does not impose any restriction 
on the relationships among attributes. 
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c=c., c = c:? 
2 
[CBL98] Figure 3.3. A simple Bayesian Multi-net 
General Bayesian Network: It is another kind of umestricted B classifier. GBN treats 
the class nodes as an ordinary node and it is not necessary that class node is a parent of 
all the feature nodes. 
. x4 
[CBL98] Figure 3.4 .. A sEmple GBN 
Comparison: On comparing Bayesian multi-nets and General Bayesian network. it is 
observed that GBNs assume that there is a single probabilistic dependency structure for 
the entire dataset; by contrast, multi-nets allow different probabilistic dependencies for 
different values of the class node. So, GBN classifiers work better when there is a single 
underlying model of the dataset and multi-net classifier work better when the underlying 
relationships among the features are very different for different classes. 
Functions of BN PowerPredictor: 
1. Learn a new general BN classifier or Bayesian multi-net classifier (with or 
without auto feature subset selection) from training data. 
2. Modify an existing BN based classifier. 
3. Use an existing BN based classifier to classify new data .. 
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Features of the BN PowerPredictor: 
User Interface: 
• Wizard-like interface: it gathers necessary input info011ation from the gIven 
training dataset to learn a BN classifier and then measure the classification 
accuracy on the given test dataset. 
• Online help: Online help is available for each step. 
• Graphical belief network editor: it is available for modifying BN classifi.er's 
structure. 
Classifier Learning Engine: 
• Wrapper algorithm. The system can automatically learn classifiers of different 
types and different complexities and choose the best one. (performance measure: 
prediction accuracy and rate of complexity) 
• Feature subset selection. The system can automatically perform feature subset 
selection. 
• Two classification modes. The classification can be performed In either batch 
mode (a data set) or interactive mode (an instance). 
• Efficiency. The system is based on fast BN learning algorithms. 
• Supporting domain knowledge. Complete ordering, partial ordering, direct causes 
and effects, forbidden links and root & leaf nodes can be used to constrain the 
search space and therefore speed up the learning process. 
• Supporting condensed data sets, which have 'frequency' fields that contain the 
number of appearances of the current entry in the data. 
• Supporting misclassification cost table definition. 
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Data PreProcessor: It is a tool used with B PowerConstructor ahd BN PowerPredictor 
for pre-processing the training data. The training data sets are processed by this data 
preprocessor before BN PowerPredictor can use them. 
Functions: 
1. Converting data from other desktop database fonnats to Microsoft JET/Access 
(* .MDB) format (as required by BN PowerPredictor). 
2. Detecting and discretizing data fields that contain continuous data. 
3. Dividing the training data into internal traini ng set and internal test set (as 
required by BN PowerPredictor). 
Features: 
• Wizard-like interface. It gathers necessary input information through 4 simple 
steps. 
• Accessibility. It supports most of the popular desktop database and spreadsheet 
formats, including: Ms-Access, dBase, FoxPro, Paradox, Excel and text file 
formats. It also supports remote database servers like ORACLE, SQL-SERVER 
through ODBC. 
• Continuous field detection. Automatically detect fields with continuous values. 
3.5 Classification and Regression Trees 
CART is an acronym for Classification and Regression Trees, a decision tree 
procedure introduced in 1984 by world-renowned DC Berkeley and Stanford statisticians, 
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Leo Breiman, Jerome Friedman Richard Olshen, and Charles Stone. A decision tree is a 
flow chart or diagram representing a classification system or predicti e model. The 
classification and regression trees methodology solves number of perfonnance accuracy 
and operational problems that still cannot be solved by many decision-tree methods. 
The Classification and regression trees methodology is technically called as binary 
recursive partitioning. The process is binary because parent nodes are always split into 
exactly two child nodes and recursive because the process is repeated by treating each 
child node as a parent. The key elements of a Classification and regression trees analysis 
are a set of rules for: 
1. splitting each node in a tree; 
2. deciding when tree is complete; and 
3. assIgmng a class outcome to each tenninal node (or predicted value for 
regression). 
To split a node into two chjld nodes, CART always asks questions that have a 
"yes" or "no" answer. CART's method is to look at all possible splits for all variables 
included in the analysis. For example, consider the DARPA data set with 5092 cases and 
41 variables. CART considers up to 5092 times 41 splits for a total of 208772 possible 
splits. 
The default splitting rule used in CART is the GIN! rule, essentially a measure of 
how well the splitting rule separates the classes contained in the parent node. (Alternative 
splitting criteria are also available). Once a best split is found, CART repeats the search 
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process for each child node, continuing recursively until further splitting is impossible or 
stopped. Splitting is impossible if only one case remains in a particular node or if all the 
cases in that node are exact copies of each other or if a node has too few cases. 
Once a terminal node is found, CART decides how to classify all cases falling 
within it. Because each node has the potential for being a terminal node, CART makes a 
class assignment for every node whether it is tem1inal or not. 
Instead of attempting to decide whether a given node is terminal or not, CART 
proceeds by growing trees until it is not possible to grow them any further. Once CART 
has generated a maximal tree, it examines smaller trees obtained by pruning away 
branches of the maximal tree. Unlike other methods, CART does not stop in the middle 
of the tree-growing process, because there might still be important information to be 
discovered by drilling down several more levels. 
Once the maximal tree is grown and a set of sub-trees are derived from it, CART 
determines the best tree by testing for error rates or costs. The misclassification error rate 
is calculated for the largest tree and also for every sub-tree. The best sub-tree is the one 
with the lowest or near-lowest cost, which may be a relatively small tree. 
Advantages of CART compared to other decision tree algorithms: 
• Reliable pruning strategy- CART's developers determined that no stopping rule 
could be relied on to discover the optimal tree, so they introduced the notion of 
over-growing trees and then pruning back; tbis idea ensures that important 
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• structure is not overlooked by stopping too soon. Other decision tree algorithms 
use problematic stopping rules. 
• Powerful binary-split approach- CART's binary decision tress are more sparing 
with data and detect more structure before too little data is I ft for learning. Other 
decision-tree approaches use multi-way splits that fragment the data rapidly, 
making it difficult to detect rules that require broad ranges of data to discover. 
• Automatic self-validation procedures- in the search for patterns in databases it is 
essential to avoid the trap of overfitting or finding patterns that apply only to the 
training data. CART's embedded test procedures ensure that the patterns found 
will hold up when applied to new data. 
• Adjustable misclassification penalties help avoid the most costly errors. 
• Multiple tree, committee-of-expert methods increase the precision of results, and; 
• Alternative splitting criteria make progress when other criteria fail. 
3.6 Variable importance in Classification and Regression Trees: 
CART provides predictor ranking i.e. variabl importance based on the 
contribution predictors make to the construction of the decision tree. Predictor rankings 
are relatively specific to the tree; by changing the tree we get diHerent rankings. 
Importance is determined by the role of each predictor either as a main splitter or as a 
surrogate. Surrogate splitters are defined as back-up rules that closely mimic. the action of 
primary splitting rules. Suppose that, in a given model, CART splits data according to 
household income. If a value for income is not available, CART might substitute 
education level as a good surrogate. 
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Variable importance, for a particular predictor is the sum across all nodes in the 
tree of the improvement scores that the predictor has when it acts as a primary or 
surrogate (but not competitor) splitter. Say for node i, if the predictor appears as the 
primary splitter then its contribution toward the importance as 
importance_contribution_node_i = improvement 
Instead if the predictor appears as the n'th surrogate instead of tbe primary predictor, then 
the expression is: 
importance_contribution_node_i = (p 1\ n) * improvement 
in which P is the "surrogate improvement weight" which is a user controlled parameter 
which is equal to1.0 by default and can be set anywhere between 0 and 1. Thus we can 
specify that the surrogate splits contribute less towards a predictor's improvement than 
primary splits. 
3.7 Classification and Regression trees and Bayesian Belief 
Network as Intrusion Detection Models 
Intrusion detection can be considered as a classification problem where each 
connection or user is identi fied as one of the attack types or normal based on some 
existing data. CART and Bayesian belief network can solve this classification problem of 
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intrusion detection as they learn the model from the data set and can dassif the new data 
item into one of the classes specified in the data set. CART and Bayesian belief network 
can be used for misuse intrusion detection as they leam a model based on the training 
data and can predict the future data as one of the attack types or nonnal based on the 
learned model. 
CART and Bayesian belief network give very good classification accuracy, even 
on smaller data sets (i.e. data sets after reduction), which is very useful as smaller data 
sets reduce the computational time for real-time intrusion detection. CART and Bayesian 
belief network are fast. This makes the system useful in real-time intrusion detection. 
CART and Bayesian Beliefnetwork construct easily interpretable models, which is useful 
for a security officer to inspect and edit. Generalization accuracy of CART and Bayesian 
belief network is another useful property for intrusion detection model. There will always 
be some new attacks on the system which are small variation of known attacks after the 
intrusion detection model is built. The ability to detect these new intrusions is possibl 
due to the generalization accuracy of the CART and Bayesian belief network. 
3.8 Audit data reduction for intrusion detection 
Srinivas Mukkamala etal [MTTJ02] has done several simulations, including binary 
classifications (nonnal and attack) and five-class classifications (normal, and four classes 
of attacks) on the DARPA data set. He used the method of deleting one feature at a time 
to rank the importance of each feature towards the overall efficiency and effectiveness. 
He used neural networks for ranking the effectiveness. Considering perfonnance as the 
basis he discovered that 19 features with feature names protocol_type, dst_bytes, 
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num_compromised, root_shell, su_attempted num_root, num_file_creations 
is_host_login, is_guest_Iogin, count, srv_count srv_serror_rate. srvJeITor_rate, 
difesrvJate, dst_host_same_src-portJate dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
dst_host_serror_rate, dst_host_sIT_seITor_rate and dst_hostJerrorJate which are labeled 
as 2,6,13,14, 15,16,17,21,22,23,24,26,28,30,36,37,38 39,40 were important 
for detecting the attack and normal patterns for five-class classification. 
3.9 Ensemble Approach 
Empirical observations show that different classifiers provide complementary 
infonnation about the patterns to be classified. Although for a particular problem one 
classifier works better than the other, a set of misclassified patterns would not necessarily 
overlap. This different information combined together yields better perfonnance than 
individual classifiers. The idea is not to rely on single classifier for decision, instead 
different classifiers individual infornlation is considered to take the final decision. We 
call this approach of combining different classifiers as ensembl approach. The 
effectiveness of the ensemble approach depends on the accuracy and diversity 0 f the base 
classifiers. 
Various techniques are developed for the ensemble approach [DieOO], [KHDM98]. 
One technique is to use different training models for different base classifiers and then 
combine their outputs, another one uses different subset of features for different base 
classifiers and combines their outputs. In this approach we use the same data set as well 
as feature set for all the base classifiers and combine them to give the final output of the 
ensemble approach. We used the highest scored class as the final output among the base 
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classifiers outputs. When the highest scored class fails, then th n Xl highest scored class 
is given preference. The architecture of the ensemble approach is depicted in figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. Ensemble Approach Design 
Algorithm A: CART Algorithm 
Algorithm B: CBL2 Algorithm (Bayesian Network algorithm) on General Bayesian 
Network Classifier. 
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Chapter 4 
EXPERIMENTATION SETUP AND 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
4.1 Intrusion Data 
The KDD Cup 1999 Intrusion detection contest data [KDD99] is used in our 
experiments. This data was prepared by the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation 
program by MIT Lincoln Labs [MIT]. Lincoln labs set up an environment of a local-area 
network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air Force LAN and they operated the LAN as if 
it were a true Air Force environment. They acqujred nine weeks of raw TCP dump data. 
The raw data was processed into connection records, which are about five million 
connection records. The data set contains 24 attack types. All these attacks fall into four 
main categories. 
1. Denial of Service (DOS): In this type of attacks an attacker makes some 
computing or memory resources too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests, 
or denies legitimate users access to a machine. Examples are Apache2, Back, 
Land, Mai1bomb, SYN Flood, Ping of death, Process table, Smurf, Teardrop. 
2. Remote to User (R2L): In thi.s type of attacks an attacker who does not have an 
account on a remote machine sends packets to that machine over a network and 
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exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of that machine. E amples 
are Dictionary, Ftp_write, Guest, Imap, amed, Phf, Sendmail, Xlock. 
3. User to Root (U2R): In this type of attacks an attacker starts out with access to 
nonnal user account on the system and exploits vulnerabilities to gain root access 
to the system. Examples are Eject, Load module, Ps Xterrn, Perl, Fdforrnat. 
4. Probing: In this type of attacks an attacker scans a network of computers to 
gather infonnation or find known vulnerabilities. An attacker with a map of 
machines and services that are available on a network can use this information to 
look for exploits. Examples are Ipsweep, Mscan, Saint, Satan, Nmap. 
The original data contains 744 MB data with 4, 940,000 records. The data set has 
41 attributes for each connection record plus one class label. Some features are derived 
features which are useful in distinguishing normal connection from attacks. Thes 
features are either nominal or numeric. Some features examine only the connections in 
the past two seconds that have the same destination host as the current connection and 
calculate statistics related to protocol behavior, service, etc. These are called same host 
features. Some features examine only the connections in the past two seconds that have 
the same service as the current connection and are called same servi.ce features. Same 
host and same service features are together called time-based traffic features of the 
connection level records. Some other connection records were also sorted by destination 
host, and features were constructed using a window of 100 connections to the same host 
instead ofa time window. These are called host-based traffic features. R2L and U2R 
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attacks don't h,ave any sequential patterns like DOS and Probe because the [oOller attacks 
have the attacks embedded in the data packets .. hereas the later attacks have many 
connections in a short amount of time. So some features that look for suspicious behavior 
in the data packets like number of failed logins are constructed and these are called 
content features. 
,4.2 Experimentation Setup and Results Analysis 
Our experiments have three phases namely data reduction, training phase and 
testing phase. In the data reduction phase, important variables for real-time intrusion 
detection are selected by feature selection. In the training phase, the system constructs a 
model using the training data to give maximum generalization accuracy on the unseen 
data. The test data is tested with the constructed model to detect the intrusion in the 
testing phase. The original data set has some 24 attack types which belong to four classes 
as described in section 4.1. The data set for our experiments contains 11982 records, 
which are randomly generated from the data set described in section 4, 1. The 41 features 
are duration, protocol-type, service, flag, src_bytes, dst_bytes, land, wrong _fragment, 
urgent, hot, num_falied_logins, logged_in, num_compromised, root_shell, su_attempted, 
numJoot, num_file_creations, num_shells, num_access_files,. num_outbound_cmds, 
is_host_login, is_guest_login, count, srv_count, serrorJate, srv_serror_rate, rerror_rate, 
srv_rerror_rate, same_srvJate, di fCsrvJate, srv_di fChost_rate, dst_host_count, 
dst_host_srv_count, dst_host_same_srvJate, dst_host_difCsrv_rate, 
dst_bost_same_srcyort_rate, dst_host_srv_difehost_rate, dst_host_serrorJate, 
dst_host_sTY_serror_rate, dst_hostJerror_rate, dst_host_sTY_rerror_rate and are labeled 
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in order as A B, C, D, E, F, G, H I J, K, L, M, N, 0, P Q R, S T D, V, W X Y Z, 
AA, AB, AC, AD, AF, AG, AH, AI AJ AK, AL, AM, AN, AO and the class label is 
named as AP. This data set has five different classes random generation of data include 
the number of data from each class proportional to size, except that the smallest class is 
completely included. This data set is again divided into training data with 5092 records 
and testing with 6890 records. All the intrusion detection models are trained and tested 
with the same set of data. As the data set has five different classes we perform as-class 
classification. The nonnal data belongs to class I, probe belongs to class2, denial of 
service (DOS) belongs to class3, user to root (U2R) belongs to class4 and remote to local 
(R2L) belongs to dass5. We used Independent component analysis algorithm and 
principal component analysis algorithm initially for data reduction. And then we used 
that reduced data set for classifying attacks. We found that ICA and PCA algorithms 
failed to perform feature selection carefully and it threw out useful data. So we used 
Classification and Regression Trees and Bayesian Belief Network for both data reduction 
and data classification. We arranged the data in text files for ICA and PCA algorithms 
present in MATLAB Software. For classification and regression trees and for Bayesian 
belief network algorithms data is saved on spreadsheets like Excel and some data base 
programs. We used AMD Athlon 1.67 GHz processor with 992 MB of RAM for our 
experiments. 
4.2.1 Independent Component Analysis 
We used the data set described in section 4.1 for evaluating the performance of 
ICA in data reduction. We did scaling and normalization on the intrusion detection data 
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set. The objective is to separate the independent components that are uncorr lated with 
other features. On the scaled data set it ga e 2 independent components among 41 
features. And then we used tbis reduced data set to check the performance accuracy. First 
the General Bayesian Network classifier is constructed using the training data and then 
testing data is tested with the constructed classifier to classify the data into normal or any 
of the remaining four attacks. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the test data. It shows 
the training and testing times of the classifier in seconds for each of the five classes and 
their accuracy in percentage terms. As can be seen from the results the accuracy of 
detection is very low. 
Training time Testing time 
(sec) (sec 
Normal 2.45 0.12 36.733 
Probe 1.09 0.14 23.812 
DOS 1.32 0.06 56.323 
U2R 1.06 0.09 74.776 
R2L 1.43 0.08 67.355 
Table 4.1 Performance of General Bayesian Network 1assifier 
on the lCA reduced 2 variable data set 
On the normalized data set, it gave 39 independent components among 41 
features. And then we used this reduced data set to check the performance accuracy. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the test data. It shows the training and testing times 
of the classifier in seconds for each of the five classes and their accuracy in percentage 
terms. 
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Training time Testing time Accuracy 
(sec) (sec) %) 
Nonnal 42.45 15.12 89.442 
Probe 41.29 14.34 84.999 
DOS 51.12 11.46 67.861 
U2R 29.16 10.09 96.227 
R2L 31.33 14.18 87.770 
Table 4.2 Performance of Genera1 Bayesian Network Classifier 
on the lCA reduced 39 variable data set 
4.2.2 Principal Component Analysis 
We used the data set described in section 4.1 for evaluating the performance of 
PCA in data reduction. We eliminated the components of the data set that contribute less 
than one percent to the variation in the data set. So, the data set is left with 17 variables 
out of 41 variables. Then we used this reduced data set to check the performance 
accuracy. The General Bayesian Network classi fier is trained using the training data and 
the trained network is then applied on the test data to classify the data into normal or 
attack patterns. The results are summarized in the Table 4.3. The training and testing 
times of the classifier are shown in seconds for each of the five classes and their accuracy 
is shown in percentage terms. The results show that the PCA reduced dataset yields poor 
accuracy. 
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Training time Testing time Accuracy 
(sec) (sec) (%) 
Normal 22.45 10.12 31.270 
Probe 21.29 14.34 34.520 
DOS 21.12 11.46 48.920 
U2R 19.16 8.09 70.360 
R2L 11.33 12.18 52.070 
Table 4.3 Performance of General Bayesian Network Classifier 
on PCA reduced 17 variable data set 
4.2.3 Bayesian Belief Network 
We used the data set described in section 4.1 to evaluate the performance of 
Bayesian belief network. General Bayesian network classifier is constructed using the 
training data and then the classifier is used on the test data set to classify the data as an 
attack or normal. Table 4.4 shows the results by using the original 41 variable data et on 
the general Bayesian network classifier. Training time and testing time ar shown in 
seconds for each of the five classes and their accuracy is shown in percentage terms. 
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Training time Testing time Accuracy 
(sec (sec (% 
Nonnal 42.14 19.02 99.571 
Probe 49.15 21.04 99.430 
DOS 54.52 23.02 99.691 
U2R 30.02 15.23 64.000 
R2L 47.28 12.11 99.112 
Table 4.4 Perfonnance of Bayesian belief network on the 41 
variable original intrusion detection data set. 
Wehave done feature selection in Bayesian belief network and found out that 
17 variables of the intrusion detection data set fom1s the Markov blanket of the class 
node as explained in section 3.4. These 17 variables are A, B, C, E, G, H, K, L, N, Q, V, 
W, X, Y, Z, AD, AF and these are considered the most important variables for intrusion 
detection by general Bayesian network classifier. Table 4.5 shows the perfonnance of 
Bayesian belief network on the reduced data set i.e. the data set consisting of only A, B, 
C, E, G, H, K, L, N, Q, V, W, X, Y, Z, AD, AF variables and the class variable. It shows 
the training time and testing time in seconds and the performance accuracy in percentage 
tenns. 
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Training time Testing time Accuracy 
(sec) (sec) % 
Nonna1 23.29 11.16 99.643 
Probe 25.07 13.04 98.571 
DOS 28.49 14.14 98.168 
U2R 14.13 7.49 60.000 
R2L 21.13 13.57 98.934 
Table 4.5 Performance of Bayesian Belief Network on the 17 
variable reduced data set. 
Comparison of Bayesian belief network performance on tbe original data set and on 
the reduced data set: 
Bayesian belief network perfom1ance is compared by using the original 41 variable 
data set and the 17 variable reduced data set. The training times and testing times for each 
classifier are decreased when the 17 variable data set is used. Moreover, by using the 17 
variable data set there is a slight increase in the performance accuracy of Normal cia s 
over the 41 variable data set. For the other classes, Probe, DOS, U2R and R2L there is 
slight decrease in the performance accuracy. 
We therefore conclude that the intrusion detection model built on the 17 variable 
data set is less computationally less expensive compared to the model built on the 41 
variable data set and the normal data is classified better with the reduced data set. From 
the table 4.6 we can conclude that the Bayesian Beliefnetwork performs better on the 
reduced data set in terms of the computational time and in terms of the accuracy for class 
Normal. 
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41 variable data set 17 variable data set 
Class Training Testing Accuracy Training Testing Accuracy 
time(s) time(s) (%) time(s) time(s) (%) 
Nonnal 42.14 19.02 99.571 23.29 11.16 99.643 
Probe 49.15 21.04 99.430 25.07 13.04 98.571 
DOS 54.52 23.02 99.691 28.49 14.14 98.168 
U2R 30.02 15.23 64.000 14.13 7.49 60.000 
R2L 47.28 12.11 99.112 21.13 13.57 98.934 
Table 4.6 Performance comparison of Bayesian Belief Network with the original 41 
variable data set and the reduced 17 variable data set. 
The graph in figure 4.1 shows the comparison of training times for the 41 variable 
original data set and the 17 variable reduced data set. The x-axis represents the number of 
classes present in the data set. The y-axis represents the training time taken for each class 
in seconds. The graph shows that the training time taken for the original dataset is more 
than the training time taken for 17 variable reduced dataset which means that the 
computational time will be reduced if we use the reduced data set for real-time intrusion 
detection. 
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Figure 4.1 Comparison of Training times of Original dataset V s 17 variable dataset 
The graph in figure 4.2 shows the comparison ofperfonnance accuracies of the 
original data set and 17 variable reduced data set for the Nonnal class of data. Dataset of 
Normal class contains 1400 data points and as it is difficult to represent all of them in the 
graph 30 data points are used. The classification value of I in the graph represents a 
correct classification and value of 2 represents a misclassification. The graph shows that 
the reduced data set gives correct classification on 1 data point more compared to the 
original data set. Therefore, it is better to use the reduced data set for classification of 
normal data and also by using the reduced data set the computational time decreases 
thereby improving the perfonnance. 
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Figure 4.2 Comparison ofPerfonnance accuracies of Original dataset Vs reduced 
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4.2.4 Classification and Regression Trees 
We used the data set described in section 4.1 for measuring the performance of 
classification and regression trees. The Classifier is constructed on the training data and 
then the classifier is used on the test data to classify the data into normal or attack. Table 
4.6 shows the performance of classification and regression trees on the 41 variable 
original data set. The training time and testing time for each classifier are shown in 
seconds and accuracy is shown in percentage terms. 
71 
Training time Testing time .Accuracy 
(sec) (sec) (%) 
Nonnal 1.15 0.18 99.643 
Probe 1.25 0.03 97.857 
DOS 2.32 0.05 99.476 
U2R 1.10 0.02 48.000 
R2L 1.56 0.03 90.586 
Table 4.7 Performance of Classification and Regression Trees on the 41 
variable original data set 
We decided the important variables by using the infonnation provided by the 
Classification and regression trees predictor ranking. Predictor rankings are in tenus of 
percentages. We eliminated the variables that have 0.00% rankings and considered only 
the primary splitters or surrogates as explained in section 3.6. This resulted in 12 variable 
data set that has C, E, F, L, W, X, Y, AB, AE, AF, AG and AI variables. Table 4.7 shows 
the performance accuracy of classification and regression trees on the 12 variable reduced 
data set.. The training times and testing times for each classifier are shown in seconds and 
accuracy is shown in percentage terms. 
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Training time Testing time Accuracy 
(sec) (sec) (%
:.L.---t 
Nonnal 0.80 0.02 100.000 
Probe 0.85 0.05 97.714 
DOS 0.97 0.07 85.340 
U2R 0.45 0.03 64.000 
R2L 0.79 0.02 95.560 
Table 4.8 Perfonnance accuracy of classification and regresslOn 
trees on the 12 variable data set. 
Comparison of performance of classification and regression trees on the original 
data set and on the red Dced data set: 
Classification and regression trees performance accuracies are compared by using 
the 41 variable original data set and the 12 variable reduced data set. From table 4.8 we 
conclude that computational time is less for the 12 variable reduced data set which is 
beneficial for real-time intrusion detection. And also the Nonnal class is classi fied 100 
percent correctly. Furthennore, the accuracies of classes U2R and R2L have increased by 
using the 12 variable data set. In the other classes such as Probe and DOS there is slight 
decrease in accuracy by using the 12 variable data set compared to the 41 variable data 
set. So Classification and regression trees therefore classify accurately on smaller data 
sets. 
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41 variable data set 12 variable data set 
Class Training Testing Accuracy Training Testing Accuracy 
time(s) time(s) (%) time(s) time(s) (%) 
Nonnal 1.15 0.18 99.643 0.80 0.02 100.000 
Probe 1.25 0.03 97.857 0.85 0.05 97.714 
DOS 2.32 0.05 99.476 0.97 0.07 85.340 
U2R 1.10 0.02 48.000 0.45 0.03 64.000 
R2L 1.56 0.03 90.586 0.79 0.02 95.560 
Table 4.9 Perfonnance comparison of classification and regression trees on 41 
variable original data set and on the 12 variable reduced data set. 
The graph in figure 4.3 shows the comparison of training times of original data set 
and 12 variable reduced data set. The x-axis represents the number ofclasses present in 
the data set and the y-axis represents the training time in seconds. The graph shows that 
the training time taken for original data set is more than the reduced data set. So by using 
reduced data set in real-time intrusion detection systems, the computational time will be 
reduced. So data reduction is necessary for real.-time intrusion detection systems. 
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of Training times of Original dataset Vs 12 variable 
Reduced dataset 
The graph in figure 4.4 shows the comparison of perfonnance of original data set 
and 12 variable reduced data set in terms of accuracy for the U2R class of data. Data set 
of U2R class contains 25 data points and all the data points are represented in the graph. 
The classification value of 1 represents a correct classification and value of 2 represents a 
misclassification. The graph shows that 4 more data points ar classified correctly by the 
reduced data set as compared to the original data set, which means that some variables in 
the original data set are hindering the process of detecting intrusions. Also using the 
reduced data set results in decreasing storage requirements and reduces the processing 
time. 
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variable Reduced dataset for U2R class. 
4.2.5 Comparing performances of General Bayesian network 
classifier and Classification and regression trees on 41 variable 
data set 
The data set used here is the 41 variable original data set. Table 4.9 shows the 
performance comparisons ofBayesian belief network and classification and regression 
trees on the 41 variable data set. The training times and testing times are shown in 
seconds and accuracies are shown in percentage terms. 
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Bayesian Belief Network Classification and Regression 
Class Training Testing Accuracy Training 
Trees 
Testing Accuracy 
time(s) time(s) (%) time(s) time(s) (%) 
Normal 42.14 19.02 99.571 1.15 0.18 99.643 
Probe 49.15 21.04 99.430 1.25 0.03 99.857 
DOS 54.52 23.02 99.691 2.32 0.05 99.476 
U2R 30.02 15.23 64.000 1.10 0.02 48.000 
R2L 47.28 12.11 99.112 1.56 0.03 90.586 
Table 4.10 Comparison of performances of Bayesian BN and Classification and 
Regression trees on the 41 variable data set 
From table 4.9 we can conclude that class Nonnal and class Probe are classified 
better by classification and regression trees algorithm. Whereas, classes DOS, U2R, and 
R2L are classified better by general Bayesian network classifier. Moreover, training 
times and testing times for each class are greater in the general Bayesian network 
classifier compared to classification and regression trees. 
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4.2.6 Comparing performances of General Bayesian network 
classifier and Classification and regression trees on 12 variable 
reduced data set 
We used the 12 variable reduced data set that is obtained from the data reduction 
algorithm in classification and regression trees. Table 4.10 shows the perfonnance 
comparisons of Bayesian belief network and classification and regression trees on the 12 
variable reduced data set. The training times and testing times are shown in seconds and 
accuracies are shown in percentage tenus. 
Bayesian BeliefNetwork Classification and Regression 
Class Training Testing Accuracy Training 
Trees 
Testing Accuracy 
time(s) time(s) (%) time(s) time(s) (%) 
Nonnal 20.10 10.13 98.786 0.80 0..02 100.000 
Probe 23.15 11.17 99.571 0.85 0.05 97.714 
DOS 25.19 12.10 98.950 0.97 0.07 85. 40 
I' U2R 11.03 5.01 48.000 0.45 0.03 64.000 
R2L 19.05 12.13 98.934 0.79 0.02 95.560 
Table 4.11 Perfonnance comparisons of Bayesian BN and Classification and 
Regression trees on the 12 variable reduced data set 
From table 4.10 we can conclude that classification and regression trees c1.assifies 
normal data very accurately. Also user-to-root attacks are classified better by -
classification and regression trees compared to general Bayesian network classifier. 
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Probe attacks, denial-of-service attacks and remote-to-Iocal attacks are classified better 
by the general BN classifier compared to classification and regression trees. 
4.2.7 Comparing performances of General Bayesian network 
classifier and Classification and regression trees on 17 variable 
reduced data set 
We used the 17 variable reduced data set that is obtained from feature selection in 
Bayesian belief network algorithm. Table 4.11 shows the performance comparisons of 
general BN classifier and classification and regression trees on the 17 variable reduced 
data set. The training times and testing times are shown in seconds and accuracies are 
shown in percentages. 
Bayesian Belief Network Classification and Regression 
Class Training Testing Accuracy Training 
Trees 
Testing Accuracy 
time(s) time(s) (%) time(s) time(s) (%) 
Normal 23.29 11.16 99.643 1.03 0.04 99.643 
Probe 25.07 13.04 98.571 1.15 0.13 100.000 
DOS 28.49 14.14 98.168 0.96 0.11 99.976 
U2R 14.13 7.49 60.000 0.59 0.02 72.000 
R2L 21.13 13.57 98.934 0.93 0.10 96.625 
Table 4.12 Performance comparisons of general BN classifier and classi fication 
and regression trees on the 17 variable reduced data set. 
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From Table 4.11 we can conclude that normal data is classifLed by both intrusion 
detection systems to the same level. Probe attacks are c1assill.ed more accurately by 
classification and regression trees. For class DOS and class U2R, classification and 
regression trees classify more accurately compared to general Bayesian network 
classifier. Class R2L is classified better by general Bayesian network classifier. 
4.2.8 Performance comparisons of different reduced data sets 
Table 4.12 and 4.13 shows the performance comparisons of classification and 
regression trees classifier and general Bayesian network classifier on 12, 17 and 19 
variable reduced datasets. The 12 variable reduced data set is obtained from the data 
reduction in classification and regression trees. The 17 variable data set is obtained from 
the feature selection procedure in Bayesian BN whereas the 19 variable reduced dataset is 
the Srinivasan's etal [MTTJ02] reduced data set as explained in section 3.7. 
L 12 variable data· 
set 
Accuracy(%) 
17 variable data set 
Accuracy(%) 
19 variable data set 
Accuracy (%) 
Nonnal 100.000 99.643 95.500 
Probe 97.714 100.000 96.857 
DOS 85.340 99.976 94.312 
U2R 64.000 72.000 84.000 
R2L 95.560 96.625 97.691 
. 
Table 4.13 Performance comparisons of classification and regression trees on different 
reduced datasets. 
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From table 4.12 we can conclude that for onnal Probe and DOS classes 12 and 
17 variable reduced datasets are much better than the 19 variable reduced data set. For 
U2R class 19 variable reduced data set performs better compared to the oth.er two. For 
R2L class there is slight increase in the performance by using 19 variable reduced data 
set compared to 17 and 12 variable reduced data set. 
12 variable data set 17 variable data set 19 variable data set 
Accuracy(%) Accuracy(%) Accuracy (%) 
Nonnal 98.786 99.643 99.571 
Probe 99.571 98.571 96:714 
DOS 98.950 98.168 99.020 
U2R 48.000 60.000 56.000 
R2L 98.934 98.934 97.869 
Table 4.14 Performance comparisons of general Bayesian network classifier on different 
reduced datasets 
From table 4.13 we can conclude that Normal, Prob ,DOS and R2L c1asse ar 
classified better by using 12 and 17 variable reduced datasets compared to 19 variable 
reduced dataset. Only for U2R class, which has only 25 data points, does the 19 variable 
reduced data classify better. 
4.2.9 Ensemble Approach on the 41 variable original data set 
In this approach we first construct the general Bayesian network classifier and 
classification and regression trees classifier individually to obtain a very good 
generalization performance (Optimizing the model for performance on unseen data rather 
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than the training data). Test data is passed through each individual niodel and the 
corresponding outputs are used to decide the final output as described in section 3.7. The 
performance of the ensemble approach is compared with the two individual models 
which were used to build the ensemble approach model and presented in table 4. l4. From 
the results we can conclude that ensemble approach gives better perfomunce than the 
two individual separately used models. 
I' 
I" 
: 
Bayesian Belief 
Network 
Accuracy(%) 
Classification and 
Regression Trees 
Accuracy 
(%) 
Ensemble Approach Accuracy 
(%) 
I 
Nonnal 99.571 99.643 99.714 
Probe 99.430 99.857 99.857 
DOS 96.691 99.476 99.930 
U2R 64.000 48.000 72.000 
R2L 99.112 90.586 
1 
99.470 
Table 4.15 Performance of Ensemble Approach on the 41 variable reduced data set 
The graph in figure 4.5 shows the R2L class data points for the three different 
models. Some 25 data points out of 563 data points are chosen to construct the graph. The 
classification value of 1 in the graph represents a correct classification and value of 2 
represents a misclassification. The ensemble approach classifies most ofthem correctly 
by picking up all the classes which are correctly classified by the two classifiers. From 
the graph we can conclude that different classifiers misclassify different data points, so 
the ensemble approach basically exploits these differences in misclassification and 
improves the performance. 
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Figure 4.5 Performance of Ensemble Approach on the Original data set for R2L class. 
4.2.10 Ensemble Approach on the 12 variable reduced data set 
We used the ensemble approach on the 12 variable reduced data set that is 
obtained from the data reduction in classification regression trees algorithm. We first 
constructed general Bayesian network classifier and classification and regression trees 
classifier individually and then the test data is passed through each individual model and 
then the outputs of each classifier are combined to get the final output as exphrined in 
section 3.7. Table 4.15 shows the comparison of ensemble approach with the two 
classifiers, which were used to build ensemble approach. From table 4.15 we can 
conclude that the ensemble approach gives better performance compared to other models. 
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Bayesian Belief 
Network 
Accuracy(%) 
Classification and 
Regression Trees 
Accuracy 
(%) 
Ensemble Approach Accuracy 
(%) 
Normal 98.786 100.000 100.000 
Probe 99.571 97.714 99.860 
DOS 98.950 85.340 99.980 
U2R 48.000 64.000 80.000 
R2L 98.934 95.560 99.470 
Table 4.16 Performance of Ensemble Approach on the 12 variable reduced data set 
The graph in figure 4.6 shows the U2R class data points for three different models. 
All the 25 data points ofU2R class are chosen for the graph. The classification value of 1 
represents a correct classification and value of2 represents a misclassification. The 
ensemble approach classifies most of them correctly by picking up all the classes which 
are correctly classified by two classifiers. We can observe from the graph that different 
classifiers misclassify different data points, so the ensemble approach basically improves 
the performance. 
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Figure 4.6 Perfonnance of Ensemble approach on 12 variable reduced data set for U2R 
class. 
4.2.11 Ensemble Approach on the 17 variable reduced data set 
We used the ensemble approach on the 17 variable reduced data set that is 
obtained from feature selection procedure in the Bayesian belief network. We first 
constructed the general Bayesian network classifier and classification and regression trees 
classifier individually and then the test data is passed through each individual model and 
then the outputs of each classifier are combined to get the final output as explained in 
section 3.7. Table 4.16 compares two classifiers with the ensemble approach. From table 
4.16 we can conclude that ensemble approach gives better performance compared to 
other models. 
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Bayesian Belief 
Network 
Accuracy(%) 
Classification and 
Regression Trees 
Accuracy 
(%) 
Ensemble Approach Accuracy 
(%) 
Nonnal 99.643 99.643 99.643 
Probe 98.571 100.000 tOO.OOO 
DOS 98.168 99.976 100.000 
U2R 60.000 72.000 72.000 
R2L 98.934 96.625 99.290 
Table 4.17 Perfonnance ofEnsemble Approach on the 17 variable reduced data set 
The graph in figure 4.7 shows the DOS class data points for three different 
models. Some 30 data points out of 4202 data points are chosen to construct the graph. 
The classification value of 1 represents the correct classification and value of2 represents 
a misclassification. The ensemble approach classifies most of them correctly. From tbe 
graph we can observe that all the 30 data points are classified correctly by ensemble 
approach thereby improving the performance. 
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Figure 4.7 Perfonnance of Ensemble approach on 17 variable reduced data set for DOS 
class. 
4.2.12 Ensemble approach by using the leA reduced data 
set to construct Bayesian Belief Network base classifier 
We used the ensemble approach 011 the 2 variable reduced data set obtained by 
Independent component analysis algorithm, the 17 variable reduced data set obtained by 
Bayesian belief network algorithm and on the 12 variable reduced data set obtained by 
classification and regression trees algorithm. We first constructed the general Bayesian 
network classifier on the lCA 2 variable reduced data set, the general Bayesian network 
classifier on the 17 variable reduced data set and the classification and regression trees 
classifier individually and then the test data is passed through each individual model and 
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then the outputs of each classifier are combined to get the final output as explained in 
section 3.7. Table 4.17 compares three classifiers with the ensemble approach. From table 
4.17 we can conclude that ensemble approach gives better per[onnance compared to 
other models. 
Normal 
Probe 
DOS 
U2R 
R2L 
ICAreduced 
data set 
accuracy (%) 
36.733 
23.812 
56.323 
74.776 
67.355 
Bayesian 
BN 
Accuracy 
(%) 
99.643 
98.571 
98.168 
60.000 
98.934 
Classification and 
Regression trees 
Accuracy (%) 
100.000 
97.714 
85.340 
64.000 
95.560 
Ensemble 
Approach 
Accuracy (%) 
100.000 
100.000 
98.253 
84.000 
98.970 
Table 4.18 Perfonnance of Ensemble Approach 
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Conclusions 
In this research we have investigated new techniques for intrusion detection and 
performed data reduction and evaluated their performance on the benchmark KDD Cup 
99 Intrusion data. We first performed data reduction on the intrusion detection data set by 
using independent component analysis algorithm and principal component analysis 
algorithm. We next used the feature selection method in Bayesian beLief network and 
then applied the data reduction algorithm present in classification and regression trees. 
Following this, we explored general Bayesian network classifier and .classification and 
regression trees classifier as intrusion detection models. We compared the training times 
of the general Bayesian network classifier on the original data set and on the reduced data 
set. We also compared the performance accuracies of Bayesian belief network on th 
original data set and on the 17 variable reduced data set. In a similar fashion, we 
compared the training times of classification and regression trees classifier on the original 
data set and on the reduced data set and we compared the performance accuracies of 
classification and regression trees classifier on the original data set and on the 12 variable 
reduced data set. We then compared the performance accuracies of classification and 
regression trees and Bayesian BN classifier on the 41 variable data set, the 12 variable 
data set and on the 17 variable data set. We have done performance comparisons of 
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different reducyd data sets. Finally we designed the ensemble approach with Bayesian 
B and classification and regression trees as base classifiers. We built 3 ensemble 
models with the original data set, 12 variable reduced data set and 17 variable reduced 
data set and compared their performance with base classifiers. 
Data reduction using independent component analysis algorithm resulted in 2 
different data sets. The 2 variable reduced data set was obtained by scaling the input data 
and the 39 variable reduced data set was obtained by normalizing the input data. The 
performance of general Bayesian network classifier with these reduced data sets was very 
low. The principal component analysis algorithm also gave a 17 variable reduced data set 
out of 41 variables. 17 variables contributed more than one percent to the variation in the 
data set. The performance of general BN classifier with this reduced data set was poor. 
We therefore used feature selection in Bayesian BN and data reduction algorithm present 
in classification and regression trees to reduce the data set. 
The training times, testing times and perfonnance of general BN clas ifier on the 
original data set is shown in Table 4.4. Feature selection in Bayesian BN resulted in 17 
variable data set including A, B, C, E, G, H, K, L, N, Q, V, W, X, Y, Z, AD, AF 
variables. These 17 variables were different from the 17 identified by the PCA algorithm. 
The training times, testing times and performance of general BN classifier on this 
reduced data set is shown in Table 4.5. Comparison of training, testing times and 
accuracies of original data set and reduced data set are shown in Table 4.6. From the table 
4.6 we can conclude that 55% savings in training time due to variable reduction for 
Intrusion detection systems maximizes the time performance and fast re-training of an 
IDS. Furthermore, accuracy of Nonnal class of data increased by 0.99% by using the 
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reduced data set. The graph in fi.gure 4.1 shows that use of a reduced data set decreases 
the computational time of real-time IDS. The graph in Figure 4.2 shows that for Normal 
class classification is better by using the reduced data set. 
Table 4.6 shows the training time, testing time taken for each classifier in seconds 
and accuracy for each classifier in percentage terms. The data reduction algorithm present 
in classification and regression trees gave 12 variable reduced data set as output and it 
consists of C, E, F, L, W, X, Y, AB, AE, AF, AG and AI variables. Performance 
comparison of classification and regression trees on original data set and on the 12 
variable reduced data set is shown in Table 4.8. From the table we can conclude that 
classification and regression trees gives better performance on the smaller training data as 
U2R class of data is classified more accurately by using the 12 variable reduced data set 
compared to the 41 variable original data set. From Table 4.8 we can conclude that 70% 
savings in training time due to variable reduction and 16% improvement in accuracy of 
U2R class. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows that the use of reduced data set reduced the 
cost of detection. The graph in Figure 4.4 shows that the use of reduced data set for 
classification reduces the overhead of the intrusion detection as a whole. 
Comparison of performance accuracies of Bayesian BN and classification and 
regression trees on the original data set is shown in Table 4.9, For Normal and Probe 
class classification and regression trees classifier gives slightly better performance 
compared to the general Bayesian BN classifier. And for the DOS, U2R and R2L classes 
general BN classifier gives better performance. Table 4,10 shows the performance 
comparisons of Bayesian Bj., classifi.er and classification and regression trees classifier 
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on the] 2 variable reduced data set. From tabl 4.] 0 we can say that for Nonnal and U2R 
classes classification and regression trees perfonns better. For the other three classes 
general Bayesian BN classifier perfonns better. For the U2R class which has less data 
points general BN classifer performed better with the original data set. So we can 
conclude that general BN classifier perfonns better with more training data. Whereas the 
classification and regression trees classifier perfon11ed better for the U2R class with the 
reduced data set compared to the original data set. We can therefore say that 
classification and regression trees perfonn better with smaller training data. Table 4.11 
shows the performance comparisons of general BN classifier and classification and 
regression trees on the 17 variable reduced data set. From table 4.11 we can say that for 
Nonnal class both classifiers classify to the same level. For Probe, DOS and U2R classes 
classification and regression trees classifier performs better. And for the R2L class 
general BN classifier perfonns better. 
Table 4.12 shows the performance comparisons of classification and r gresslOn 
trees on different reduced datasets. For the Normal and Probe classes both 12 and 17 
variable datasets perfonned better compared to the Srinivasan's etal [MTTJ02] reduced 
data set. For DOS class 17 variable reduced data set perfonned better than the 
Srinivasan's data set whereas the 12 variable data set performance is low compared to 
both. For the U2R class and R2L class srinivasan's dataset performed slightly better 
compared to the other two. Table 4.13 shows the performance comparisons C?f general 
Bayesian network classifier on different reduced datasets. For the normal class 17 
variable data set perfonned better than the other two. For Probe class the 12 variable data 
set performed better than the other two. 
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For DOS class srinivasan's dataset performed better than the other two. For the 
U2R class the 17 variable data set performed better. And for the R2L class both 12 and 
17 variable datasets performed better than Srinivasan's dataset. 
The ensemble approach with the two base classifiers Bayesian BN and 
classification and regression trees was constructed and evaluated its performance with the 
two base classifiers on the original data set, 12 variable and 17 variable reduced datasets. 
The results in table 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 suggest that ensemble approach is a good model 
for intrusion detection. The ensemble approach combines the complementary features of 
the base classifiers. The ensemble approach gave 100% accuracy for Normal class on the 
12 variable reduced data set and. 100% accuracy for Probe and DOS classes on the 17 
variable reduced data set. The results in table 4.17 show the performance of the ensemble 
approach with the three base classifiers. The first base classifier was the Bayesian BN 
classifier constructed on the 2 variable ICA reduced data set, the second one was the 
Bayesian BN classifier constructed on the 17 variable reduced data set and the third one 
was the classification and regression trees classifier constructed on the 12 variable 
reduced data set. The results show that ensemble approach performs much better than the 
three base classifiers. This suggests that if proper base classifiers are chosen 100% 
accuracy might be possible for other classes too on different datasets. 
93 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[BCHSTT01] E. Bloedorn, A.D. Christiansen, W. Hill C. Skorupka, L.M. Talbot 
J .Tivel. Data Mining for Network Intrusion Detection: How to Get Started. The MITRE 
Corporation, McLean, VA, Pages 1-9,2001. 
[BFOS84]L. Breiman, J. Friedman, R. Dlshen, C.Stone. Classification and Regression 
Trees. WADSWORTH INTERNATIONAL GROUP, Belmont, California, Pages 93-126, 
1984. 
[Big96] J. Bigus. Data Mining with Neural Network. McGrawHill, 1996. 
[Can98] J.Cannady. Artificial Neural Networks for Misuse Detection. School of 
Computer and Information Sciences, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale, 
Pages 4-9,1998. 
[CBL98] J. Cheng, D. Bell, W·. Liu. Learning Bayesian Networks from Data: An 
Efficient Approach Based on Information Theory. Technical Report, Pages 24-28, 1998. 
[CG99] 1. Cheng, R. Greiner, Comparing Bayesian Network Classifiers. (Proceedings of 
the fifteenth conference on uncertainty in artificial intelligence, 1999) Department of 
Computing Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H1 Canada, Pages 
2-6, UAI'99. 
[CGOl] J. Cheng, R. Greiner, Learning Bayesian Belief Network Classifiers: Algorithms 
and System. (proceedings of the fourteenth Canadian conference on artificial intelligence, 
(J4 
2001) Department ofCornputing Science, University of Alberta Edmonton Alberta T6G 
2HI Canada Pages 3-8, AI'2001. 
[DBS92] H. Debar, M. Becker, D. Siboru. A Neural Network Component for an Intrusion 
Detection System. PIOC. IEEE Symp. on Research in Computer Security and Privacy, 
pp.240-250, 1992. 
[Di;m97] D.E. Denning. An Intrusion Detection Model. In IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, February 1987. 
[DieOO] T. G. Dietterich. Ensemble Methods in Machine Learning. Proceedings of the 151 
International Workshop on Multiple Classifier Systems, Cagliari, Italy, 2000. 
[FRA94] Jeremy Frank. Artificial Intelligence and Intrusion Detection: Current and 
Future Directions. Division of Computer Science, University of California at Davis, CA, 
June 1994. 
[GWC98] A.K Ghosh, J. Wanken, F. Charron. Detecting Anomalous and Unknown 
Intrusions Against Programs. Reliable Software Technologies, Sterling, VA, 1998. 
[H099) A. Hyvarinen, E. Oja. Independent Component Analysis: A Tutorial. Helinski 
University of Technology, Finland, Pages 8-18, April 1999. 
[HYV99] A. Hyvarinen. Survey on Independent Component Analysis, Helinski 
University of Technology, Pages 7-15,1999. 
95 
[l1g92] K. llgun. USTAT: A Real-Time Intrusion Detection System for UNIX. Master 
Thesis, University of Californj a, Santa Barbara ovember 1992. 
[KDD99] KDD cup 99 Intrusion detection data set. 
<http://kdd. ies.uei. edu/databases/kddenp99/kddcup.data_10yercent. gz> 
[KHDM98] J. Kittler, M. Hatef, R. P. W. Duin, J. Matas. On Combining Classifiers. 
IEEE Trans. on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 20(3), pp. 226-229, 1998. 
[Lee99] Wenke Lee, A Data Mining Framework for Constructing Features and Models 
for Intrusion Detection Systems. PhD Thesis, Columbia University, Pages 227-259, 1999. 
[LSM99] W. Lee, S. Stolfo, K. Mok. A Data Mining Framework for building Intrusion 
Detection Models. In Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
Oakland, CA, May 1999. 
[LSMOO) W. Lee, S. Stolfo, and K. Mok. Adaptive Intrusion Detection: a Data Mining 
Approach. Journal Artificial Intelligence Review, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Pages 
20-30, 2000. 
[Lu099) J. Luo. Integrating Fuzzy logic with Data Mining Methods for Intrusion 
Detection. Master's Thesis, Department of Computer Science, Mississippi tate 
University, Mississippi, Pages 9-13, 1999. 
[MHL94] B. Mukherjee, L.T. Heberlein, K.N. Levitt. Network Intrusion Detection. IEEE 
1994. 
96 
[MIT] MIT Lincoln Laboratory. <http://www.ll.mjt.eduJIST/ideva1J> 
[MJS02] S. Mukkarnala, G. Janoski, A. Sung. Intrusion Detection: Support Vector 
Machines and Neural Networks. Department of Computer Science, New Mexico Institute 
of Mining and Technology, Socorro, New Mexico, 2002. 
[MJS02] S.Mukkamala, G. I. Janoski, A.H. Sung. Intrusion Detection Using Support 
Vector Machines. Department of Computer Science, New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology, Socorro New Mexico, 87801 USA, 2002. 
[MSA02] S. Mukkamala I, A. H. Sung 1,2, A. Abraham J. Identifying Key Variables for 
Intrusion Detection Using Soft Computing Paradigms, IDepartment of Computer 
Science, 2Institute for Complex Additive Systems Analysis, New Mexico Tech, Socorro, 
New Mexico 87801, 3Department of Computer Science, Oklahoma State University, 700 
N Greenwood Avenue, Tulsa, OK 74106,2002. 
[MS03] S.Mukkamala, A. H. Sung. Identifying Significant Features for Network 
Forensic Analysis Using Artificial Intelligent Techniques. Dept of Computer Science, 
New Mexico Tech, Winter2003. 
[MTTJ02] S. Mukkamala, G.R. Tadiparthi, N. Tummula, G. Janoski. Audit Data 
Reduction for Intrusion Detection. Dept of Computer Science, New Mexico Institute of 
Mining and Technology, Scorro, New Mexico, 2002. 
[RLM98] J.Ryan, M. Lin, R. Mljkkulainen. Intrusion Detection with Neural Networks. 
The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas, 1998. 
97 
[Sie99] R. S. Sielken. Application Intrusion Detection. Master's Thesis School of 
Engineering and Applied Science, University of Virginia, Pages 20-30, May 1999. 
[SM03] A. H. Sung, S. Mukkamala: Identifying Important Features for Intrusion 
Detection Using Support Vector Machines and Neural Networks. Pages 209-217, SAINT 
2003. 
[Sun96] A. Sundaram. An Introduction to Intrusion Detection. ACM Cross Roads, Vol. 2, 
No.4, April 1996. 
[UnadOOJ S. Unadkat. lCA Applications in Data Mining. Masters Thesis,. Pages 15-30, 
2000. 
[ZarnOl] D. Zamboni. Using Internal Sensors for Computer Intrusion Detection. PhD 
Thesis, Purdue University, Pages 2-22, August 2001. 
[ZLOO]Y. Zhang, W. Lee. Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. In 
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Mobile omputing and Networking 
(MobiCom 2000). Boston, MA, August 2000. 
98 
VITA 
Srilatha Chebrolu 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
Thesis:  DATA REDUCTION AND DATA CLASSIFICATION IN AN 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
Major Field: Computer Science 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Kandukur, Andhra Pradesh, India, On July 1, 1979, the 
daughter of Venkateswarlu Chebrolu and Chinnammayi Chebrolu. 
Education: Graduated from Simhapuri Public School, NeUore, India in May 
1995;Passed out from Adarsha Junior College, Ongole, India in May 
1997;received Bachelor ofTechnology from Shadan ollege of Engineering 
and Technology, Hyderabad, India in June 2001. Completed the 
requirements for the Master of Science degree with a major in Computer 
Science at Oklahoma State University in Decemb r,2003. 
Experience: Employed by Oklahoma State University, Department of Computer 
Science as a graduate teaching assistant for Advanced Operating systems; 
served as a Web Developer for the Oklahoma State University, Department 
ofMathematics, 2001 to present. 
